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The ideal of equality is widely invoked in law and morality, but
doubts persist that it represents a meaningful, coherent, distinctive norm.
Are those doubts justified?  If they are not, what explains their
persistence?
These questions come to the fore once again in light of a recent
ingenious essay by Christopher J. Peters purporting to show that equality is
a self-contradictory or absurd norm.1  Peters' argument is in the same
tradition as Peter Westen's writings in the 1980's,2 culminating in his 1990
book.3  Westen, similarly, claimed that equality is an empty, or at least
dangerously confusing, idea.4  Moreover, outside the legal academy,
political theorists and philosophers continue to disagree over the question
whether, or in what sense, equality is a meaningful principle.5
Thus, most theorists other than Peters agree that meaningful,
substantive egalitarian norms exist—most notably, nondiscrimination rights
(such as the right not to be disadvantaged on the basis of race or sex) and
many distributive justice theories (such as John Rawls’ difference
principle).  But it is much more controversial whether the so-called
“formal” principle of equality (that likes should be treated alike, or equals
should be treated equally) or the principle of “precedential” or
“prescriptive” equality6 (that the prior treatment of another, like individual
                                           
1Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1210 (1997).  Peters’
specific target is what he calls “prescriptive” equality.  See Section C.3 [“Limited to
Historical Differences in Treatment”] infra.
Kent Greenawalt has replied to certain aspects of Peters’ thesis.  Greenawalt,
“Prescriptive Equality”: Two Steps Forward, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1265 (1997).
2Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982)(“Empty Idea”).
Westen's article prompted a number of replies, including Steven J. Burton, Comment on
“Empty Ideas”: Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 Yale L. J. 1136
(1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen,  81
Mich. L. Rev. 575 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1167 (1983); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev.
245 (1983).
3Peter Westen, Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of “Equality”
in Moral and Legal Discourse (1990).
4Westen’s original article emphasizes the emptiness of equality, while his book puts
much greater stress on the complexity, variety, and potential confusion of egalitarian
norms.  The evolution of Westen’s ideas is revealed by the fact that Westen does not cite
his original “Empty Idea” essay in the bibliography to his book, and explicitly disowns
the title in his Preface.  Id. at xix-xx (asserting that equality is not meaningless but
instead derivative, and acknowledging the usefulness of a certain class of equality rights
and of the presumption of equality).  However, Westen’s “Empty Idea” essay continues
to be cited with much greater frequency than his book.
5See, e.g., Madison Powers, Forget about Equality, 6 Kennedy Inst. of Ethics J. 129
(1996); John Kane, Justice, Impartiality, and Equality: Why the Concept of Justice Does
Not Presume Equality, 24 Polit. Theory 375 (1996); Amartya Sen, On the Status of
Equality, 24 Polit. Theory 394 (1996); John Kane, Basal Inequalities: Reply to Sen, 24
Polit. Theory 401 (1996).
6“Precedential” equality is my nomenclature.  Peters describes this principle as
“prescriptive” equality.  See text at notes = infra.
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gives a second individual a claim to equal treatment) is a genuine principle
of equality.7
Moreover, the principle of equality prompts several troublesome
objections.  First, it seems to demand the multiplication of wrongs: if
someone in the past was incorrectly given more (or less) than she deserves,
then equality seems to demand a repetition of the mistake for all who are
similarly situated.  Thus, “two wrongs make a right,” in the sense that two
wrongs are what equality sometimes requires.  Second, sometimes equality
seems to demand “leveling down,” to no one’s benefit.  If the resources of
two groups or classes are to be equalized, then apparently we satisfy
equality if we take resources away from the more fortunate group, even if
this does not benefit the less fortunate.  Third, conventional equality
analysis has been criticized by some feminists for endorsing only a
superficial form of equal treatment, according to which government
satisfies egalitarian norms when it provides veterans’ benefits “equally” to
men and women with the same military backgrounds (notwithstanding that
men are the predominant beneficiaries), or when it “equally” denies
parental leave to both sexes (even though women predominantly suffer the
burden of such a policy).  And where women are not in fact similarly
situated to men (for example, in their ability to bear children), conventional
equality analysis seems incapable of criticizing unjust policies (such as a
blanket policy of firing pregnant workers).
This article defends the norm of equality against such criticisms.  I
argue that a single general conception of the right to equal treatment
operates not only in the relatively uncontroversial contexts of
nondiscrimination rights and distributive justice principles, but also in those
contexts (the formal principle and precedential equality) where equality’s
force and coherence are in greater doubt.  That single conception helps
identify when the formal principle and precedential equality do, and when
they do not, express a distinctive equality principle.
                                           
7Consider two recent survey articles on the topic.  Richard Arneson identifies two
aspects of the ideal of equality–equality of democratic citizenship (assuring equal basic
rights to all members of society) and equality of condition or of life prospects.  Richard
J. Arneson, Equality, = 489.  Brian Barry distinguishes three roles that the concept of
equality plays within political philosophy:
“Equal treatment for equals” specifies that those who are equal in some
relevant respect should be treated equally.  “Fundamental equality” refers to the
idea that all human beings are of equal worth, have equal (fundamental) rights,
or should be awarded equal respect and concern.  “Social equality” [includes]
political equality, economic equality, and equality of status among the members
of a society.
Brian Barry, Equality, 1 Encyclopedia of Ethics 322-323 (Lawrence C. Becker ed.
1992).  Barry then suggests that “equal treatment for equals” captures a significant sense
of equality, but is an empty formula until the relevant “equals” are specified.  So the
popular demands for equality must, he concludes, refer to one of the other senses of
equality.  Id. at 323.  My analysis of the first formula is a bit different.  See text at notes
= infra.
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In brief, the single conception of the right to equal treatment that
applies in these different contexts has a relational or comparative logic.  In
its negative form, it is the conception that certain traits or criteria are
impermissible bases for the unequal distribution of treatments.  In its
positive form, it is the conception that if one person or class of persons
obtains a benefit, so should another person or class.  In either form, the
conception expresses a genuine and distinctive right to equal treatment.
The very point of the right is to forbid certain inequalities, or to assure
certain equalities.  Equality is not simply a consequence of the application
of other principles whose point is essentially noncomparative.
This comparative conception has much greater explanatory power
than either formal equality, precedential equality, or Peters' so-called
nonegalitarian justice (NEJ).8  According to NEJ, the injustice of racial
discrimination and other forms of invidious discrimination consists solely in
the decisionmaker's giving weight to irrelevant criteria.   But this
reductionist account is grossly deficient.  It drastically oversimplifies the
moral and legal issues at stake, and also trivializes them.9
The basic conception of equality that I defend in this article is
simple.  But the role of equality in moral and legal argument is complex.
The confusions that equality has engendered are due, I believe, not to the
obscurity or meaningless of the basic concept but to the widely varying
contexts in which equality arguments are employed.  More careful attention
to those contexts reveals that the various objections to equality–as an
empty, confusing, or gratuitous concept; as requiring the multiplication of
wrongs or leveling down; or as privileging the status quo, adopting a
superficial standard of “sameness,” and devaluing difference–are either
overstated or mistaken.
To reject any use of the concept of equality in legal and moral
argument10 would be an enormous mistake.  Contrary to Peters and other
skeptics, we often do, and we should, care about equality as an
independent normative goal.  The norm of equality, with its distinctive
logic and force, has powerfully shaped the analysis of a range of critical
social issues–from the distribution of wealth, opportunities, and legal rights
across a society, to the prohibition of invidious criteria such as race or
ethnicity, to the requirement that government officials and others act
impartially.  Our discourse would be greatly impoverished, and moral
argument would be greatly and unnecessarily complicated, if we abjured
                                           
8See Peters, supra note 1=, at 1228.
9Peters has a similarly impoverished view of John Rawls' difference principle.  See text
at notes 141-146= infra.
10This article addresses equality in both law and morality, and it provides numerous
examples from each domain.  The conceptual and general nature of the argument
justifies, I believe, employing the same analysis in both domains.  Of course, many
moral theories will support egalitarian norms that it would be infeasible to recognize in
law.  And many legal institutions might value forms of equality (such as requirements of
impartiality in administering discretionary benefits or burdens) that moral theories
would scant.
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the concept of a right to equal treatment, as Peters and other authors
suggest.
A final note on terminology.  This paper addresses, not every
conceptual and normative issue provoked by the term “equality,” but
instead the meaning of a right to obtain (or a duty to accord) equal
treatment.  For convenience, I will employ “equality” as a shorthand for
such a right or duty.  I will also point out occasions when theorists use the
term “equality” in a different sense.
A. The supposed problems with equality
This section briefly reviews some of the principal difficulties that
critics have raised about whether equality norms are useful, plausible, or
justifiable.  Later sections of the paper will address these and other
difficulties in more detail.  (The supposed problems are closely related.)
1. Emptiness
In his well-known article and in responses to criticism, Westen
claimed that equality is a meaningless concept, a pure tautology, which can
be completely replaced by other rules or norms.11  The concept of
“equality” that Westen is here criticizing, and that he claims is the most
basic and general, is the formal principle, “likes should be treated alike.”12
To use one of his examples, if a standard prescribes that all Rhodes
Scholars shall receive fellowships to Oxford, then we would achieve
“equality” and would “treat likes alike” simply by implementing the
standard faithfully.13  Giving fellowships to some Rhodes Scholars but not
others, or giving them to no Rhodes Scholars, would violate the precept
that likes should be treated alike, but only because the precept itself
identifies the standard of “likeness.”  The statement of equality collapses
into a statement of a right (of any Rhodes Scholar to a fellowship).14
Equality is a tautology.15
                                           
11Westen, Empty Idea, supra note 2=; Westen, On “Confusing Ideas”: Reply, 91 Yale
L.J. 1153 (1982); Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math & Morals: A
Reply, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 604 (1983); Westen, To Lure the Tarantula from Its Hold: A
Response, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1186 (1983).
12Westen, Empty Idea, supra note 2=, at 539.
13Id. at 545.
14Id. at 542.
15Id. at 547-548.  As Westen argues:
To say that two persons are the same in a certain respect is to presuppose a
rule–a prescribed standard for treating them–that both fully satisfy.  Before
such a rule is established, no standard of comparison exists.  After such a rule
is established, equality between them is a “logical consequence” of the
established rule.  They are then “equal” in respect of the rule because that is
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2. Confusion
Westen, in both his earlier writings and his book, argues that
equality arguments often engender confusion.  Equality, he claims,
masquerades as an independent norm and therefore conceals the real nature
of the rights that it incorporates.16  And equality supports the “fallacy of
equivalents,” misleading people into believing that if, say, blacks are
considered equal to whites in the sense that blacks are protected from
invidious discrimination, then blacks must be equal to whites in the very
different context of affirmative action.17
In his book, Westen asserts a number of other confusions that
equality engenders.  Prescriptive and descriptive equality are often
confused, as in the statement that “all men are created equal.”18  Equality is
assumed to have a unifying feature: arguments for equality in a particular
domain are falsely believed to further a general historical movement
towards greater equality.19  And there is a misleading semantic bias in favor
of equality, as opposed to inequality.20  Thus, Westen asserts, Abraham
Lincoln succeeded in putting Stephen A. Douglas on the defensive by
invoking equality as support of the abolition of slavery.  But, Westen
claims, the concept of equality did not really help Lincoln, and Douglas
could just as well have invoked a competing equality to support his
position.21  Although Lincoln surely had the better argument, Westen
                                                                                                                                 
what equal means: “Equally” means “‘according to one and the same rule.’”
They are also then entitled to equal treatment under the rule because that is
what possessing a rule means: “To conform to a rule is (tautologically) to apply
it to the cases to which it applies.”
Id. at 548 (footnotes omitted).
Peters agrees that such “traditional” equality arguments state the tautology that
“‘People identically entitled to a particular treatment are identically entitled to that
treatment.’”  Peters, supra note 1=, at 1217.
16Id. at 580-581.  For example, it encourages vague equal protection standards for the
evaluation of “fundamental interests” when substantive due process would be a clearer
doctrinal approach.  Id. at 581 n. 154.
17Id. at 581-584.  See Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, at 269-270.  See
also id. at 262-265 (arguing that equality in law and morals is confused with
mathematical equality; the latter, but not the former, means equality in all respects).
18Id. at 266-267 =[Spell out his argument; note that W’s sense of prescriptive equality
differs from Peters’].
Similarly, Westen asserts, prescriptive equality is often grounded on descriptive




[Douglas] could have responded, not by defending inequality, but by advocating
a competing equality such as the equal rights of the citizens of each state to
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concludes, the reason the argument was better was not its closer affinity
with the misleading concept of equality.22
3. Gratuitousness
Perhaps equality is an unnecessary and superfluous concept.  Peters
claims that equality is just a descriptive consequence of achieving
nonegalitarian justice.  “I am not against equality,” Peters reassures us:
Equality, in its descriptive sense, is a necessary product of
nonegalitarian justice, and I am all for nonegalitarian justice.  If we
treat people rightly, we always in some sense treat them equally.
Of course I support treating people rightly.  But ... if we treat
people equally, we do not necessarily treat them rightly.23
Westen has made the same point.24  Moreover, other theorists similarly
doubt that normative equality principles are coherent and meaningful
(except insofar as they follow from nonegalitarian principles).25
In the end, Westen concludes that we could remove the term
“equal” from the inscription on the United States Supreme Court building,
“equal justice under law,” without changing the meaning of the phrase.26
                                                                                                                                 
decide for themselves whether to abolish slavery, or the equal right of all
persons (free and slave, white and black) to receive the treatments to which
they were entitled under state and federal law.
Id. at 282.
22Id. at 283.
Joseph Raz asserts that “intellectual confusion” is the price of employing two
very different conceptions of egalitarianism--the “rhetorical” and the “strict.”  Raz, The
Morality of Freedom 228 (1986).  This distinction essentially tracks my distinction
between lexical equalities and comparative equality rights.  However, insofar as Raz
finds comparative equality rights to be meaningful, I do not count his observation about
confusion as a criticism of equality.
23Id. at 1213 (emphasis original).
24Westen, Empty Idea, supra note 2=, at 542; Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra note
3=, at xix (“[J]ust as all normative disputes are about equality, none is really about
equality.”), 127 (to the same effect).
Peters purports to offer an argument that differs from Westen’s insofar as
Peters focuses on successive rather than simultaneous unequal treatments.  But Westen
did address this situation, as well, within his category of “prescriptions as baselines
within descriptive standards of comparison.”  See Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra
note 3=, at 87-89, 98-99, 189-192.  See also id. at 219-223.
25E.g. John Kane, Justice, Impartiality, and Equality: Why the Concept of Justice Does
Not Presume Equality, 24 Polit. Theory 375 (1996); = reply by Amartya Sen; = rebuttal
by Kane; Louis Pojman, Theories of Equality: A Critical Analysis, 23 Behavior &
Philos. 2, 25 (1995).=others.
26Westen, Empty Idea, supra note 2=, at 558; see also Westen, Speaking of Equality, at
xiii (arguing that omission of “equality” from the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
would not change the meaning of the Amendment).
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And Peters, in the same vein, concludes that we could remove the term
“equal” from the language of the equal protection clause itself without
changing the meaning of that clause.27
The claim that egalitarian principles are gratuitous presupposes that
some other standard is meaningful.  What are the concepts of “rights” or
“nonegalitarian justice” from which “equality” arguments supposedly
derive, and to which they can supposedly be reduced?  Westen and Peters
offer similar definitions.
According to Westen, “[r]ights ... means all claims that can justly be
made by or on behalf of an individual or group of individuals to some
condition or power–except claims that ‘people who are alike be treated
alike.’”28  According to Peters, “nonegalitarian justice” means “treatment
of a person in accordance with the net effect of all the relevant criteria and
only the relevant criteria, provided that considerations of nontautological
equality cannot be relevant criteria.”29
What about nondiscrimination rights, such as the right not to be
disadvantaged because of race?  Are they not essentially about equality?
No, according to Peters.  Consider Yick Wo v. Hopkins, for example,
where the city denied permits to operate laundries to all Chinese applicants
but granted permits to almost all Caucasian applicants.30  The Supreme
Court relied on the equal protection clause to invalidate the policy.  But
Peters asserts that the injustice in Yick Wo is not a failure to respect
equality.  Rather, it reflects the principle that no one should be denied or
granted a privilege based on an irrelevant characteristic.  Race is such a
characteristic.  Even if only one person had been denied or granted a permit
based on an irrelevant criterion, Peters claims, the same injustice would
have been done; and this shows that the right is not based on equality.31
4. The multiplication of wrongs
One of the most common objections to equality is the complaint
that equality requires the multiplication of wrongs.  “The fullest,
nontautological claim of the egalitarian,” says Peters, “comes down to this:
sometimes a person should be treated wrongly simply because another,
identically situated person has been treated wrongly.”32  (The wrong,
                                           
27Peters, supra note 1=, at 1258.
28Westen, Empty Idea, supra note 2=, at 540 (footnote omitted).
29Peters, supra note 1=, at 1228 (emphasis omitted).  Peters believes that his
formulation differs from Westen’s insofar as “nontautological equality” differs from
“likes should be treated alike.”  However, Peters ignores Westen’s more complex
analysis in Speaking of Equality.  See note 24= supra.
30118 U.S. 356 (1886).
31Peters, supra note 1=, at 1219-1220; see also id. at 1258-1259.  I will discuss, and
criticize, this “one person reductio” below.  text at notes == infra.
32Peters, supra note 1=, at 1212 (emphasis original).  See also id. at 1225-1226 n. 31,
1226, 1227, 1250, 1252, 1252 n. 61, 1257, 1263, 1264.
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Peters explains, can consist in undeserved beneficial treatment as well as
undeserved detrimental treatment.33)
Others have emphasized the same objection.34  Consider the
question whether a later court should invoke equality as a reason to follow
an earlier court’s precedent, even when the later court believes the
precedent to be mistaken.  According to Larry Alexander (as well as
Peters35), the answer is no: “intertemporal equality cannot convert an
otherwise morally erroneous decision into a correct one.”36  Alexander
makes the point vividly:
                                           
33Id. at 1212.
34Peter Westen cites the following example from William Frankena: “If a ruler were to
boil his subjects in oil, jumping in afterwords himself, it would be an injustice, but it
would be no inequality in treatment.” Frankena, The Concept of Social Justice =17
(cited in Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, at 90).  See also =other cites=.
The objection is often asserted by death penalty proponents.  One major
argument against the death penalty is that it is administered in a highly arbitrary way,
where “arbitrary” includes the unjustified imposition of a death sentence on some but
not all of those who deserve it.  Ernest van den Haag has forcefully responded with the
multiplication of wrong objection:
[Some] appear to prefer equal injustice–letting all get away with murder if
some do–to unequal justice: punishing some guilty offenders according to
desert, even if others get away.  Equal justice is best, but unattainable.  Unequal
justice is our lot in this world.  It is the only justice we can ever have, for not all
murderers can be apprehended or convicted, or sentenced equally in different
courts.  We should constantly try to bring every offender to justice.  But
meanwhile unequal justice is the only justice we have, and certainly better than
unequal injustice–giving no murderer the punishment his crime deserves.
Ernest van den Haag, Refuting Reiman and Nathanson, in Punishment and the Death
Penalty 207, 214 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1995).  See also Ernest
van den Haag, The Collapse of the Case against Capital Punishment, National Review,
March 31, 1978, p. 397:
[T]he abolitionist argument from capriciousness, or discretion, or
discrimination, would be more persuasive if it were alleged that those
selectively executed are not guilty.  But the argument merely maintains that
some other guilty but more favored persons, or groups, escape the death
penalty.  This is hardly sufficient for letting anyone else found guilty escape the
penalty.  On the contrary, that some guilty persons or groups elude it argues for
extending the death penalty to them.
35Peters’ objections to equality were first stated in the context of his objection to using
equality to justify precedential constraints.  See Christopher J. Peters, Foolish
Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 Yale L. J. 2031,
2055-2064 (1996).  See also Peters, supra note 1=, at 1226 n. 32, 1263.
36Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1989).  See also
Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 57, 85-86 (1996); Larry
Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin’s
Theory of Law, 6 L. & Phil. 419, 427-430 (1987); David Lyons, Formal Justice and
Judicial Precedent, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 495, 505, 508 (1985).
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To take an extreme example, if most members of a particular group
of people have been subjected to grossly unjust treatment–say,
slavery or genocide–seeing that the rest of the members are
subjected to the same treatment is no less wrong despite its
furtherance of “equality.”  Neither two nor two million wrongs can
make a right, however much they equalize situations.  Nor is the
two millionth wrong somehow less wrong than the first.37
5. Leveling down and waste
Suppose a class of persons fails to obtain a benefit that another
class obtains, or suffers a burden that another class avoids.  And suppose
the inequality is unjustifiable.  Equality is satisfied, it seems, either by
giving the relevant benefit to (or withholding the burden from) both
classes, or by denying the benefit (or extending the burden) to both classes.
The latter option amounts to “leveling down” the more fortunate.  But this
seems indefensible.  How can we justify an outcome that makes some
people worse off and no one better off?38  Here is an example from
philosopher Derek Parfit:
Consider ... those Egalitarians who regret the inequalities in our
natural endowments.  On their view, it would be in one way better
if we removed the eyes of the sighted, not to give them to the blind,
but simply to make the sighted blind.  That would be in one way
better even if it was in no way better for the blind.  This we may
find impossible to believe.39
Similarly, equality seems to demand waste: if equal extension of a
benefit to all is infeasible, then the only apparent option consistent with
equality is wasteful withholding of the benefit from all, even though it is
                                           
37Id. at 10.
38See Arneson, supra note 7=, at 501-502; Dennis McKerlie, Equality and Priority, 6
Utilitas 25, 27 (1994); Dennis McKerlie, Critical Notice of Temkin, Inequality, 25 Can.
J. Phil. 623, 633-636 (1995); McKerlie, Equality, 106 Ethics 274, = (1996); Derek
Parfit, Equality or Priority?, The Lindley Lecture, Univ. of Kansas, Nov. 21, 1991, pp.
17-18, 23-24; Madison Powers, Forget about Equality, 6 Kennedy Inst. of Ethics J. 129
(1996)(=); Larry S. Temkin, Inequality, Ch. 9 (1993); Pojman, supra note 25=, at 11.
39Parfit, id. at 17.  Parfit continues with another example:
Egalitarians would avoid this form of the objection if what they think bad is
only inequality in resources.  But they must admit that, on their view, it would
in one way better if, in some natural disaster those who are better off lost all of
their extra resources, in a way that benefitted no one.  This conclusion may
seem almost as implausible.
Id.
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feasible and socially valuable to benefit some.40  Consider one of Peters’
examples.  If a lifeboat will hold only ten of eleven survivors of a
shipwreck, and all eleven have an equal right to a place in the lifeboat, then
equality demands either the impossible (saving all) or the unthinkable
(letting all eleven drown).  That is, since we must, by hypothesis, let at
least one drown, and since the other ten are similarly situated, equality
demands that we let them drown, too.  Only nonegalitarian principles,
Peters concludes, can explain the decision to save some but not all.41
6. Privileging the status quo
Feminist scholars have provided some of the most detailed,
thoughtful analyses of the concept of equality.42  One important critique
that some feminists have developed is the claim that conventional equality
analysis privileges the status quo.
Early feminist legal challenges to discriminatory practices tended to
adopt a “sameness” approach, demanding that women obtain what men
already were entitled to (in the way of job opportunities or other legal
privileges).  But this approach defines equality in terms of the male
standard.  It therefore fails to address ways in which women are different
from men (such as their capacity for bearing children).43  It also fails to
challenge the legitimacy of the male standard itself.44  For example, if
women’s equality means only that women are entitled to work conditions
equal to men’s, and if those work conditions are defined according to a
male standard that downplays family responsibilities relative to efficient
work production, then promoting equality means promoting an
unacceptable and unjust status quo.
Moreover, conventional equality analysis might only guarantee a
superficial form of equal treatment.45  The conventional analysis might
require that female military veterans receive the same civil service job
preference or other benefits that male veterans with the same length and
type of service receive; but it does not seem to permit a more basic
                                           
40See Raz, supra note 22=, at 227, 235; Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at 1277 n. 41.
41Peters, supra note 1=, at 1237-1238.  Peters concludes that each person should be
given an equal (10/11) chance at the scarce benefit, and asserts that this principle is
grounded in nonegalitarian justice.  Id. at 1240-1243.  Below, I will endorse his
conclusion but challenge the assertion that nonegalitarian justice is the operative
principle here. =discuss later= text at notes = infra.
42For a helpful overview, see D. Kelly Weisberg, Introduction, Feminist Legal Theory:
Foundations 121-127, 211-220 (Weisberg, ed. 1993).
43See id.  See also Anne Dailey, Feminism’s Return to Liberalism 102 Yale L. J. 1265
(1993); Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American
Law (1990); Cynthia Ward, On Difference and Equality, 3 Legal Theory 65 (1997).
44See Weisberg, id.
45A closely related complaint is that conventional equality analysis creates an illusion of
neutrality.  See Mary Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1988 S. Ct. Rev. 201,
=.
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challenge to the veterans’ preference itself, a preference that inures largely
to the benefit of men.46  Similarly, a policy of “equally” denying parental
leave to both men and women, or of “equally” denying reimbursement for
all “voluntarily” incurred medical expenses including pregnancy, can
nevertheless be unjust insofar as each policy burdens women much more
severely than men; but conventional equality analysis might be inadequate
to express this injustice.
7. Privileging sameness and devaluing difference
A related feminist critique is that conventional equality analysis
privileges the idea of “sameness” and devalues the ways in which women
are different from men.
Legal treatment of pregnancy is the central illustration of this
critique.  In two much-criticized decisions, the Supreme Court rejected the
claim that discrimination according to pregnancy is sex discrimination.47
For many feminists, these decisions reflect a defect in conventional or
“formal” equality analysis.  That analysis requires equal treatment only if
women are similarly situated to men (with respect to the purpose of the law
or policy).  But if women have a distinctive condition or quality, such as
the capacity to bear children, they are not similarly situated.  It then seems
that conventional equality norms cannot justify policies that protect women
from unfair treatment premised on these distinctive conditions (for
example, a policy forbidding employers from firing all pregnant workers).
One response to these concerns is to endorse “special treatment”
rather than “equal treatment.”  But a norm of “special treatment” can be
criticized as patronizing and paternalistic.  If “special” and “equal”
treatment are each problematic justifications for policies recognizing the
distinctiveness and social importance of sex-specific conditions, we are
pushed towards the unpalatable conclusion that such policies are not
justifiable at all.
B. What equality is
Rather than respond immediately to these objections to egalitarian
arguments, I will present what I believe to be a more persuasive account of
the logic and force of equality.  A later section addresses the supposed
problems directly, and shows that equality analysis, if carefully employed, is
robust enough to avoid these objections..
                                           
46See Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)(upholding an absolute
lifetime civil service job preference for veterans with passing scores on examination,
even though 98% of the beneficiaries of this preference were male).
47General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (Title VII analysis); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (equal protection analysis).
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I begin with a simple example of a genuine right to equal treatment.
Suppose my daughter reports that a new girl has just joined her
kindergarten class.  Some members of the class had refused to let the new
girl contribute to their joint art project because "she talks funny": she has a
foreign accent.  The teacher became angry with the class about this.  Why
would the teacher be angry?  A natural answer, and one that I would try to
explain to my daughter, is that the exclusionary behavior of some members
of the class was unfair, for it unfairly singled out one girl in a way that hurt
her feelings, for no good reason.  A slightly more formal answer is that
each girl in the class has a right, or is entitled, to equal treatment from her
peers with respect to participating in school activities; more generally, each
girl has a right to be treated with equal respect.
Notwithstanding straightforward examples such as this, the
meaning of a right to equal treatment can be surprisingly complex or
ambiguous.
1. One meaning of “A and B should be treated equally”
“Equality” can be used in either a descriptive or prescriptive sense.
Even in its prescriptive or normative48 sense, it is crucially ambiguous.
Suppose my children Bonnie and Clyde would like to have dessert after
eating their dinner tonight.  And suppose they assert that they are
“normatively equal” in the sense that they “should be treated equally” in
that respect.  Such normative equality can mean:
(1)  Equal entitlement of two or more persons to a particular
treatment, as a result of each person’s independent right to that
treatment.
Consider an example:
(1A) I have promised Bonnie that she may have dessert if she
finishes her dinner, calls back a friend, and picks up her room.  I
have promised Clyde that he may have dessert if he finishes his
dinner, packs up his sports equipment for tomorrow, and practices
his piano.  Each is entitled to dessert.  Their entitlements are equal.
But normative equality can also mean:
                                           
48I employ the term “normative equality” in this section rather than “prescriptive
equality” simply to avoid confusion with Peters’ narrower conception of “prescriptive
equality,” discussed below.  It is unfortunate that Peters has employed the general term
in such a specialized way.  “Precedential equality” might have suited Peters’ purposes
better while avoiding confusion, as I will explain.  text at notes 123-139= infra.
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(2)  A right to equal treatment, the point of which is to equalize
treatment between two or more persons in some respect.
Consider another example:
(2A)  I have promised my children that if I permit either one of
them to have dessert, I will permit the other to have dessert, too.
 The first sense of normative “equality” is trivial and derivative.
Equality of entitlements in (1A) is merely a consequence of applying two
separate rules or principles.49  Here is a more extreme example:
(1B)  Jones is a convicted murderer who has been sentenced to
death.  Because of Jones' moderate mental illness and doubts about
his guilt, the governor exercises clemency and reduces his sentence
to life imprisonment.  Smith is a repeat felon who violates the
state’s “three strikes and you’re out” provision, and therefore is
sentenced to life imprisonment.  Jones and Smith each
independently deserves a punishment of life imprisonment.  They
deserve the same punishment.
  Are Jones and Smith entitled to equal treatment?  Not in any
important sense.  They have no right to equal treatment as such, but only
separate rights to treatments which, as it turns out, are equal.
Two criteria of genuine equality rights help us to see why cases
such as (1A) and (1B) do not exemplify genuine equality rights.  One
criterion expresses the point that inequality is a distinct additional wrong,
beyond the fact of denial of a benefit.  This first (“distinctive wrong”)
criterion therefore asks whether unequal (as opposed to simple) denial of
the benefit creates an additional wrong.  In cases such as (1A) and (1B),
the answer is no.  The second (remedial) criterion recognizes that the
wrong of inequality can be redressed either by extending benefits to all
relevant persons or by denying benefits to all: it asks whether equal and
uniform denial of the benefit to all persons is better in any respect than
unequal denial.  And again, in cases such as (1A) and (1B), the answer is
no: uniform denial is not better, but is instead the worst state of affairs.50
Consider the first, “distinctive wrong” criterion.  If beneficial
treatment were unequally distributed to the persons or classes who rely on
the supposed equality right expressed in (1), the denial of the benefit to one
person or group would violate their independent rights, but it would not
violate any right to equal treatment.  If the governor’s pardon of Jones is
                                           
49In an earlier article, I spell out this point in more detail.  Kenneth W. Simons,
Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 387, 393-416 (1985).  See also Raz,
supra note 22=, at 225; Parfit, supra note =, at =.
50This assertion must be qualified, however, in the case of what I call impure equality
rights.  See Section B.3= infra.
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not given proper legal effect, then Jones has a valid complaint that he
should receive the benefit of the pardon, but Jones has no independent right
of equal treatment with Smith.  Whether or not Smith receives the proper
legal punishment of life imprisonment is irrelevant to Jones’ entitlement.
Similarly, if, under (1A), one child does and the other does not receive
dessert, the disappointed child can validly complain that I failed to honor
my promise, but cannot validly complain that I failed to treat him or her
equally, as I should have.51
Now consider the second, remedial criterion.  Under a proper
understanding of the principles in (1), considered by themselves, equal and
uniform denial of the benefit to all persons is the worst state of affairs, and
most certainly is worse than unequal denial.  If Smith and Jones both suffer
the death penalty, rather than the term of life imprisonment to which each is
separately entitled, this is a worse state of affairs than one in which only
Jones or only Smith is denied what he deserves.  And if I fail to honor my
promises (in (1A)) to both children, I bring about a worse state of affairs
than if I fail to honor one only promise.
Contrast principle (2).  Here, equality plays a more fundamental
role.  The very point of the principle is to achieve equality.  And unequal
distribution of benefits necessarily violates the principle, while equal
distribution does not.  But equal distribution satisfying the equality
principle can consist either of equal conferral of the benefits or of equal
denial.  It is consistent with (2A) for me to give dessert to both children, or
to neither.  Or, to return to the kindergarten example, perhaps the children
may do individual art projects, but once they choose to do a group project,
they should not exclude any child from the project (at least absent a strong
reason).
Consider, then, how the two criteria would apply to principle (2).
As to the first (“distinctive wrong”) criterion, unequal (as opposed to
simple) denial of the benefit does create an additional wrong under
principle (2).  Indeed, it might create the only type of wrong, if the
decisionmaker violates no rights and otherwise does no wrong in declining
to confer the benefit.  Giving dessert to one child but not the other violates
an equality principle (namely, (2A)), quite apart from whether either child
was promised dessert (e.g., under a principle such as (1A)).
And, as to the second (remedial) criterion, it is now no longer the
case that equal and uniform denial of the benefit to all persons is the worst
state of affairs.  Rather, from the perspective of respecting the equality
right in (2), uniform denial of the benefit is indeed a better state of affairs
than unequal denial.  From the perspective of respecting my children’s right
to equal treatment as expressed in (2A), it is better if I give dessert to
neither than if I give it to one; and it is neither better nor worse if I give
dessert to both rather than to neither.
                                           
51This example does raise a doubt.  If I honor my promise as to one child, should I not
honor my promise as to another?  And doesn’t that deeper obligation express a genuine
egalitarian duty?  I explore this point further below.  See Section D.1= infra.
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Still, is it better, all things considered, to give dessert to one than to
none?  The answer depends on the force of other moral or legal reasons for
actions, as we shall see.52
2. A comparative right
The equality principle expressed in (2) is one important category of
comparative right--that is, a right whose point is to equalize the treatments
of different persons, or to create some other relative relationship in those
treatments.53  Comparative rights can guarantee relationships other than
equality.54  They might guarantee preference for one group as compared to
                                           
52Section D.4= infra.
53The first explicit account of comparative rights or comparative justice is Joel Feinberg,
Noncomparative Justice, 83 Phil. Rev. 237 (1974).  See also Joel Feinberg, Social
Philosophy ch. 7 (1973).  Other important accounts include Joseph Raz, supra note 22=,
Ch. 9; and Joshua Hoffman, A New Theory of Comparative and Noncomparative
Justice, 70 Phil. Stud. 165 (1993).  In the legal literature, see Greenawalt, supra note 2=,
at 1178-1183; Simons, supra note 48=, passim; Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra
note 3=, at 131-145.  As applied to the debate over the capricious implementation of the
death penalty, see Stephen Nathanson, Does It Matter If the Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily
Administered?, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 161, 163, 167-168 (1985).
This article discusses comparative equality rights.  Most of the analysis would
also, however, apply to and explain a duty to treat people equally, even if no right
corresponded to that duty.  A teleological view, for example, might decline to recognize
rights in victims of equality, but might justify a duty to bring about the best state of
affairs, which in turn is defined in part as the reduction or elimination of certain
inequalities.  (On Raz’s view of rights, to have a right is to have an interest that grounds
another’s duty.  Raz, supra note 22=, Ch. 7.  So an egalitarian right does imply a duty;
but an egalitarian duty does not imply that anyone has a right against the dutyholder.)
One possible difference between the duty and the right is this: government
might have a duty to level down, yet it might be the case that no one has a right that
inequality be leveled down, since leveling down makes no one better off.  Whether this
conclusion follows, however, depends on whether inequality creates any special injury
apart from the relative level of tangible benefits or resources.  See text at notes = infra.
54See Simons, supra note 48=, at 438 n. 114:
In general, comparative rights are of this form:
(A) If class T obtains benefit or burden B, then class S should obtain f(B)
where f(B) is some function of B.  If the function is equality, i.e., f(B) = B, then the
result is a comparative equality right:
(B) If class T obtains B, then class S should obtain B.
(For a similar account, see Raz, supra note =, at 225: “(6) All F’s who do not have G
have a right to G if some Fs have G.”)
This account does not accurately describe nondiscrimination rights, however.
Such rights have a logic of the following form:
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another, as in some affirmative action plans; or they might guarantee, not
strict equality, but instead constraints upon inequality.  (Rawls’ difference
principle is an example.55)
Nondiscrimination rights clearly are comparative.  The point of the
right is to forbid the government or other duty-holder from discriminating
against certain persons or classes on the basis of specified traits or reasons.
Egalitarian political theories are also obviously comparative.  Their point is
to assure a specified form of equality (or to forbid specified forms of
inequality) in resources, opportunities, or rights.56
Comparative rights have several important characteristics.  First,
their requirements are contingent.  Comparative rights do not, by
themselves, require anything.  But, when conjoined with actual treatments
or other entitlements, they can require a particular form of treatment.
Thus, the right expressed in (2A) provides that if one child obtains dessert,
so shall the other.  Similarly, the effect of a right not to be discriminated
against on the basis of race depends on what initial treatment the
decisionmaker has chosen to provide.  If an employer offers a particular
level of pay to entry-level whites, he must offer that level to entry-level
blacks.  However, he may lower the level of pay to entry-level whites, so
long as the pay he offers to entry-level blacks is no lower.
This last example underscores a second important feature of
comparative rights: flexibility.  Any distribution of treatments that satisfies
the requisite comparative relationship will satisfy the right.  Under (2A), I
may give dessert to both children, or to neither.  And, in the discriminatory
pay scale example, the employer may (putting aside for now other legal and
moral constraints) raise or lower the pay scale as much as he likes, so long
as he does not vary pay along racial lines.57
                                                                                                                                 
(N) Characteristic R shall not be used to permit or justify the unequal distribution
of B.
The relation between negative equality rights (such as nondiscrimination rights (N)) and
positive equality rights (such as (B)) seems to be as follows:
(N*) If class T obtains B, and if class S would otherwise be entitled to B except for
S’s possession of characteristic R, then S should obtain B.
For a less formal analysis of discriminatory motives and stereotypes, see text at
notes = infra [B.4=, Equality of Respect].
55“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are ... to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged.”  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 83 (1971).
56See, e.g., David Miller, Arguments for Equality, in 7 Midwest Studies in Philosophy
73 (P. French et al eds. 1982).
57Of course, the decisionmaker’s flexibility depends on the scope of the comparative
right.  S might have a right to equal treatment with T with respect to some benefits but
not others.  (Women might have a right not to suffer discrimination with respect to job
opportunities, but not with respect to obtaining private dinner invitations.)  And the
right might be, not to equality, but to the minimization of inequality, either within a
certain range or subject to certain compelling reasons.  (The difference principle
exemplifies the latter; a guaranteed minimum income computed as a percentage of the
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This point, that comparative rights may be flexibly satisfied, also
implies that their violation may be flexibly remedied.  If a court finds an
equal protection violation, it may, consistently with the egalitarian norms
embodied in the equal protection clause, permit the wrongdoer to respond
either by extending or denying the benefits to both classes in question.58
(In the case of burdens, it may permit the wrongdoer to either extend them
to, or remove them from, both classes.)  Of course, other moral and legal
principles might constrain these options.  For example, if the relatively
advantaged beneficiaries have a contractual or moral right to rely on
continued receipt of the benefits, then extension of benefits might be the
only acceptable option.59  Still, the equality right itself would be satisfied
by either type of remedy.60
                                                                                                                                 
mean income would exemplify the former.)  Further, equality as to B might be
guaranteed only as to a certain range of B.  For example, legal or moral principles might
require equal basic health care, but permit unequal distribution of elective or cosmetic
surgery.
58This feature accounts for the otherwise inexplicable standing doctrine in equal
protection cases: the complainant has standing to object to the more favorable
discriminatory treatment of others even if the remedy for the discrimination might level
down the benefits of others, thus leaving the complainant with the same benefits.  See
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738-39 (1984); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
Indeed, a complainant has standing even if the remedy would only directly benefit others
in his class (such as other white applicants objecting to an affirmative action program).
The theory in this last category of cases is that the injury from the equality violation “is
the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the [racial] barrier, not the
ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”  Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated
General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 653, 666 (1993).
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, §2.5.3
(1997); John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 89-90 (5th ed. 1995).
59When a legislature prospectively restricts benefits, it often “grandfathers” some past
beneficiaries, continuing at least some of their benefits for some period of time, while
imposing the new restrictions on all new beneficiaries.  A strict “leveling up”
requirement would forbid such grandfather provisions.
Moreover, even if a grandfather clause is the legislature’s response to a judicial
finding that it has violated equality principles, it might be upheld, if the protected
beneficiaries have a strong reliance interest.  See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 746
(1984)(“We have recognized, in a number of contexts, the legitimacy of protecting
reasonable reliance on prior law even when that requires allowing an unconstitutional
statute to remain in effect for a limited period of time.”).  See also Nordlinger v. Hahn,
505 U.S. 1, 13 (1992); Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 639-642 (7th Cir. 1984).
60In his book, Peter Westen now concedes that equality rights have this type of
distinctive flexibility.  Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, at 134.  My
arguments explicating equality as a comparative right might have influenced Westen to
change his view.  Id. at xx.
However, Westen continues to understate the distinctiveness of equality rights.
Thus, with respect to the claim by Raz and me that the very point of equality rights is to
achieve equality in treatment, Westen partially demurs: “[W]hile all rights aim toward
equality, only antidiscrimination rights aim solely toward equality.  All rights require,
and (if faithfully applied) result in, relationships of equality.” Id. at 140.  I disagree that
noncomparative rights aim toward equality at all.  Rather, equality is their incidental
effect, a mere byproduct of requiring the duty-holder to provide a specified form of
noncomparative treatment to a class of persons.  And even this effect depends on the
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In this analysis of flexibility, I have been assuming a “pure” equality
right.  But some equality rights are neither so pure nor so flexible.  The
next section explores the interesting category of “impure” equality rights,
which cannot be honored by leveling down benefits, denying them to all
(nor by leveling up burdens, thus extending them to all).
Consider now a third important feature of comparative rights,
including equality rights: their generality.  Comparative rights have a
distinctive shape or logical structure, but their content is otherwise
unspecified.  Accordingly, the comparative shape can accommodate an
enormous range of different specific rights.  The actual content of the
equality right depends on the context, including the function of the right in
a larger legal or moral system.  Equality principles can govern issues as
momentous as the distribution of primary social goods (liberty and
opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect) in the basic
structure of society, as in Rawls’ difference principle,61 or as mundane as
the distribution of dessert to one’s children.62  Equality rights potentially
apply to burdens as well as to benefits63; to omissions as well as acts; to
multiple as well as single decisionmakers; to simultaneous as well as
successive decisions64; to moral as well as legal rules; to higher-level as
well as lower-level principles65; and to positive as well as negative rights.66
Equality rights can demand quantitatively identical treatment of classes, but
they can also require the reduction or minimization of inequality (for
example, the amelioration of past discrimination against women, blacks,
and other historically disadvantaged groups; or the prohibition of social
inequalities that are not to the benefit of the worst off67).  And equality
rights can address not just the treatments distributed by a decisionmaker,
                                                                                                                                 
right having the form of an entitlement under a classification or rule, rather than the
form of an entitlement held by uniquely specified individuals.  See text at notes 107-
109= infra.
61Rawls, supra note 51=, at 62.
62For discussion of the scope of equality principles, varying according to subjects,
domain, and other factors, see William B. Griffith, Equality and Egalitarianism:
Framing the Contemporary Debate, 7 Can. J. L. & Juris. 5 (1994); Douglas Rae et al.,
Equalities (1981).
63However, in his response to Peters, Greenawalt clarifies that he is agnostic about
whether “the principle of equality should authorize giving people worse [rather than
better] treatment than they otherwise deserve.”  Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at 1289
(footnote omitted).
64Compare a situation in which an employer first hires a white person, then later refuses
to hire an equally qualified black, with a situation in which the hiring decisions are
made simultaneously.
65In a legal system, egalitarian norms can be constitutional, statutory, or common law.
See Simons, supra note 48=, at 423.
66See text at notes 56= supra.
67See generally Rawls, supra note 51=.
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but the deeper and more subtle question of how a distributional decision
affects the status of different social groups.68
The justification of an equality right might be consequentialist (or
instrumental): a society might prohibit racial discrimination in order to
prevent racial strife.  But the justification might also be deontological: the
victim of racism has a special grievance because the perpetrator has treated
her with egregious disrespect.69
Comparative rights can extend to both traits and interests.  Thus, in
equal protection law, government requires an unusually strong justification
in order to discriminate based on the trait of race or gender, or in order to
discriminate against those exercising a right to free speech or a similarly
fundamental interest.  And equality rights can forbid not only any use of a
trait, but also explicit reliance on particular factors as reasons for a
decision, or even bringing about a particular type of effect on those with
the trait.  Thus, Title VII forbids not only “disparate treatment” on the
basis of race and gender, but also certain forms of “disparate impact” or
effect.70
                                           
68This distinction might help explain the feminist debate over whether women should
frame their claims of unjust treatment in terms of “sameness” or instead “difference.”
See Section B.4= and text at notes 233-237= infra.
69For discussion of the distinction between deontological and teleological (including
consequentialist) accounts of equality in the context of distributive justice, see Larry
Temkin, supra note 38?=; Parfit, supra note 38=; Dennis McKerlie, Equality, 106 Ethics
274 (1996).
Peters apparently assumes that equality rights, to be genuine, must be
deontological.  But he does not explain his assumption.  For example, in replying to
Greenawalt’s views, he concedes that “good consequentialist reasons” may explain “why
certain kinds of decisionmakers should avoid the appearance of partiality or bias,” but
he concludes that these considerations (which I would certainly classify as egalitarian)
are entirely a matter of nonegalitarian justice, not of deontological equality.  Peters,
supra note 1=, at 1239-1239 n. 46.  And, in discussing the Lucky/ Unlucky lottery
hypothetical, he concedes that permitting the inequality might undermine confidence in
government, or reduce the willingness of people to play the lottery.  Therefore, he
concludes, our real concern is nonegalitarian justice, not equality.  See also id. at 1250
n. 58 (“We favor equal treatment of children by their parents ... because we want
children to feel that they are equally loved and that their parents are unbiased and
impartial...”).  But again, it is not clear why equality should not be considered an
important and distinctive legal and moral concept simply because its value is viewed as
instrumental rather than intrinsic.
70=cites=
  Consider also the Supreme Court’s treatment of wealth discriminations.  The
Court forbids explicit use of wealth to discriminate between classes of citizens, and
forbids intentional discrimination against the poor, but permits most classifications that
disproportionately affect the poor, such as fee requirements that the poor find much
more difficult to meet.  See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (1988);
==explicit discrim. cite=.
Peters asserts that justice requires not just the correct outcome, but also that the
reasons actually relied upon were the morally relevant ones.  Peters, supra note 1=, at
1229, 1230.  This need not be so.  An equality right (as well as other rights and justice
principles) might be concerned only with reasons, or only with outcomes, or with both.
In Title VII, for example, disparate impact cases involve only outcome, while disparate
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Finally, equality rights can take the form of a decisionmaker’s duty
to provide a rational explanation of a difference in treatment.  In equal
protection doctrine, for example, the government must give at least a
minimal explanation of the reason or reasons justifying any distinction of
which the plaintiff complains.  I will say more about such a “demand for
reasons” later.71  For now, notice that the demand for reasons is one
possible, and nonmysterious, sense of a “presumption of equality.”72  The
stringency of such a demand depends both on the strength (and other
characteristics) of the reason that the duty-holder must offer, and on the
scope of the cases to which the demand applies.  Thus, such a demand
might be satisfied by a slight or implausible justification, orSeptember 1,
1999 it might instead require a powerful actual reason.  And it might apply
only in cases where the duty-holder owes a special relationship to
recipients of the treatment, or instead in all cases in which people are
treated differently.  For example, a parent’s duty to explain differences in
treatment to a child might require a relatively strong justification, but the
duty is limited to the narrow domain of decisions affecting his own
children.73  Conversely, the government’s duty under equal protection
doctrine to justify most legislative classifications requires only a very weak
justification, but the duty applies to the very wide domain of all
classifications affecting any citizens.
The generality of equality norms understandably prompts the
complaint (voiced especially by many feminists) that equality is
indeterminate, and hence not a very useful norm.74  This complaint has
some bite.  The norm of equality ordinarily has such positive connotations
that people with widely varying ideologies are tempted to invoke it on their
side.75  But the complaint is overstated, for several reasons.  First, equality
only describes a general concept, a concept that must be given particular
content in order to have determinate meaning in any social context.
Second, even as a general concept, equality has distinctive features that are
worth analyzing and attending to, if it is to be useful in moral and legal
debate.  Third, the complaint that equality is indeterminate sometimes really
reflects a much narrower complaint: that some specific conception of
equality is indeterminate, or is less determinate than its proponents
                                                                                                                                 
treatment cases typically involve a combination of impermissible reason and
discriminatory outcome.
71See text at notes 172-180= infra.  In earlier writing, I employed the misleading term
“implicit comparative rights” for this idea.  Simons, supra note 48=, at 421-427.
72See Simons, supra note 48=, at 456-459 (citing literature); Westen, supra note 3=, at
=.
73The parent’s duty to explain or justify other distinctions in treatment, such as
distinctions among friends or other family members, might be less stringent.
74See, e.g., Diana Majury, Strategizing in Equality, =; Lucinda Findley, Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and Workplace Debate, =.
75See Westen, supra note 3=, at =.
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believe.76  When that is so, of course, the appropriate response is to clarify
that conception of equality.
3. Pure and impure equality rights
We can distinguish pure from impure equality rights: the former
permit greater remedial flexibility than the latter.  Pure equality rights
requires equality as to some benefit or burden, and are satisfied either by
leveling up or by leveling down.  Impure equality rights are asymmetrical
and more directly beneficial to recipients: they require leveling up benefits
(or leveling down burdens)77 until both classes are equally benefited (or
equally relieved of the burden).
Many legal equality rights are pure.  The equal protection clause
guarantees this form of equality.78  Contrast an impure equality right:
(2B) (Impure equality right) If D impermissibly discriminates
against class S and in favor of class T in the distribution of B,
providing smaller benefit B1 to S and larger benefit B2 to T, then
S’s benefits shall be raised to B2.
Some antidiscrimination legislation requires leveling up, including the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act79 and the Equal Pay Act.80
                                           
76I believe that this is the essence of the critique of some feminists.  For example, they
might  object (and with good reason) that modern equal protection doctrine addressing
sex discrimination improperly restricts its focus to whether a classification adequately
furthers a legislative purpose and thus “treats like alike.”  See text at notes 227-237=
infra.
77The “leveling down” objection normally refers to leveling down benefits, not burdens.
But insofar as relief from a burden is a kind of benefit, the leveling down objection
sensibly includes an objection to “leveling down” that kind of benefit as well, i.e.,
denying all persons relief from the burden (or, more simply, extending the burden to
all).
78There are some exceptions, as noted shortly.  But we should distinguish, and not count
as a genuine exception, situations in which a successful plaintiff in an individual equal
protection or antidiscrimination rights case obtains a “make whole” remedy that rewards
her but not others who are similarly situated.  Such a remedy might be awarded merely
for instrumental reasons, to encourage the bringing of lawsuits.  The more important
question is whether the class of which she is a part is entitled to be leveled up.  If not,
then the equality right that she asserts does not demand leveling up.
79Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §621 (1994)(“It shall be unlawful
for an employer [to discriminate against an employee because of the employee’s age] or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.”)
80Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §206 (1994)(“[A]n employer who is paying a wage
rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the
[nondiscrimination] provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any
employee.”).  See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 988 (6th
Cir. 1992).  For discussion, see Susan M. Omilian & Jean P. Kamp, Sex-Based
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 Which type of equality right one endorses depends in part on
whether the underlying justification for the right is teleological or
deontological.  As Derek Parfit has pointed out, a teleological approach to
equality will be (in my terminology) pure: the teleological approach states
that inequality is to some extent intrinsically bad, however it is produced,
and that equality is to some extent good, whoever is benefited or harmed
by the elimination of inequality.81  Accordingly, one has a moral reason to
eliminate inequality in either direction.  By contrast, a deontological
approach can recognize impure as well as pure equality rights.82  If our
approach is deontological, for example, we might recognize rights in the
victims of equality; our moral concern need not be limited to the intrinsic or
consequential badness of inequality itself.  And we might believe that
victims are entitled, not just to have inequality eliminated, but to have it
eliminated in a way that directly improves their welfare.
An impure equality right lacks the flexibility of a pure equality right.
Accordingly, recognizing impure rights will often be impractical.  (The
discriminator might not be able to afford to raise the benefit level up.)  Still,
the impure right could have some force–for example, it could require
government to increase S’s benefits at least for some defined period of
time, or to as high a level as is feasible.  Or we might recognize a modified
impure equality right, permitting leveling down if but only if this benefits
                                                                                                                                 
Employment Discrimination (1990 & 1996 Supp.).  The Equal Pay Act redresses certain
forms of sex discrimination in employment.
What are the limits of these statutory obligations to level up?  The case law is
unclear.  The employer is not required to maintain a wage level or a set of employment
positions indefinitely.  Thus, under the ADEA, even if a plaintiff was illegally denied a
position because of age, “if a reduction-in-force or a legitimate reorganization
eliminated plaintiff’s job, reinstatement would not be required.”  Mack A. Player,
Employment Discrimination Law 554 (1988).  But presumably the reason, to be
“legitimate,” must be other than a simple desire to level down to rectify the inequality.
By contrast, effectuating that desire is a perfectly legitimate remedial response to the
violation of pure equality rights.
81Parfit is discussing the view that inequality is an intrinsically bad consequence or state
of affairs, to be distinguished from the more typical teleological view that inequality is
often bad because it leads to further bad consequences, such as envy, civil strife, or
inefficiency.  Teleologists (including consequentialists) can compare the value of
outcomes by their degree of equality, as well as by the aggregate well-being they
produce.  See Parfit, supra note 38=, at 5-6.
82See Parfit, supra note 38=, at 18:
If we are Deontic Egalitarians, we do not believe that inequality is bad, so we are not
forced to admit that ... it would be in one way better if inequalities were removed by
levelling down.  We can believe that we have a reason to remove inequality only when,
and only because, our way of doing so benefits the people who are worse off.  Or we
might believe that, when some people are worse off than others, through no fault or
choice of theirs, they have a special claim to be raised up to the level of the others, but
they have no claim that others be brought down to their level.
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the victims of inequality by leveling them up.83  (The government would be
permitted to lower T’s benefits in order to fund an increase to S.84)
If the benefit at issue is discretionary, however, then an impure right
is often no more beneficial to victims of inequality than a pure right is.  For,
insofar as the decisionmaker (D) has discretion to retract the benefit, he
may retract it as to both classes, effectively leveling down.  For example,
welfare benefits are usually viewed as fully discretionary in this sense.
Therefore, a wrongfully discriminatory distribution of such benefits can be
remedied prospectively by leveling down, even if the victims of the
discrimination have an ostensible (impure) right to be leveled up.
On the other hand, sometimes a benefit is discretionary only in the
sense of being optional: D could initially decline to confer it.  Once D does
confer it, however, it becomes vested: D has no discretion to retract it.  An
impure equality right indeed provides a special benefit to victims in this
situation, i.e., when the benefit is optional but vested.  For example,
suppose an employer promises to give a lifetime annuity to men but not to
women.  Women have a right to be leveled up; the employer has no
discretion to level down.  (But the benefit was optional: D could have
declined in the first instance to provide an annuity to either group.)
Finally, if the benefit is nondiscretionary (i.e., not optional) in the
first instance, and it is provided to some but denied to others, then the
impure form of the equality right is always possible.  Suppose a nation
guarantees all citizens a constitutional right to vote, but this right is actually
provided to men but not to women.  And suppose that, in addition to a
noncomparative claim, women have an equality claim not to be
                                           
83With respect to the remedial, leveling down v. up issue, we can imagine categories of
equality right other than pure, impure, and modified impure.  Suppose S obtains 10, T
obtains 20, and this inequality is unjustifiable.  A super leveling down principle would
justify leveling down of both groups (e.g., if this were the only feasible way to achieve
equality).  It would justify reducing both S and T to 9.  Conversely, a super leveling up
principle would justify leveling up of both groups (e.g., increasing both S and T to 21).
More unusual categories are also imaginable.  A leapfrog leveling down
principle would justify moving the higher group to a level lower than that of the lower
group (e.g., lowering T to 9), if this move reduces inequality.  And a leapfrog leveling
up principle would justify moving the lower group to a level higher than that of the
higher group (e.g. raising S to 21).  (These last two categories might be the only realistic
options in some indivisible benefit cases.  =discuss?=)  For a thorough analysis of the
different measures of inequality, see Temkin, supra note 38=.
The persuasiveness of Rawls’ difference principle relies in part on our moral
objections to a super leveling down principle.  He assumes that we start from a position
of equality of primary social goods (including liberty, wealth and income), and that
social and political institutions (including a market system) are permissible if the
inequalities that they produce benefit all citizens, including those who are worst off.
Rawls, supra note 51=, at 14-15, 78.  Rejecting his solution would, in effect, amount to
insistence on super leveling down, a scenario that not only does not help the worst off,
but actually worsens their position relative to what it would have been.  See Parfit, supra
note 38=, at =; Temkin, supra note 38=, at =.
84Of course, the permissibility of even limited leveling down depends on the force of T’s
right to the existing level of benefits.
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disadvantaged on the basis of sex.  Their equality claim could be impure,
i.e. a claim to be leveled up.
Do impure equality rights make sense?  Are they really equality
rights at all, insofar as they require that inequality be eliminated in only one
way?85  Yes, they are still genuine equality rights, and they still are flexible
in the relevant way, for the decisionmaker could have avoided any problem
in the first instance by treating the groups equally, providing benefits at
either the lower or the higher level.  To be sure, he may not remedy an
impure equality right violation by leveling down.  But initially he could
have “leveled down”–or, more precisely, he could have declined to level up
unequally.86
For example, an employer might have discretion over the decision
whether to provide a wage increase to workers in a particular job category.
Suppose he increases wages for men but not women, or for a job category
in which men predominate but not for a similar job category in which
women predominate.  It is intelligible to demand that he remedy his
equality violation by leveling up rather than down, even though he could
initially have provided lower, equal wages to both categories of workers.
Impure equality rights respond to history: they demand that actual
inequality be rectified in the way that more tangibly benefits the victims.87
Impure equality rights are most plausible when the equality right
involves an impermissible trait such as race or gender, and less plausible
when it involves a positive right to equal distribution of an opportunity or
resource.  When an impermissible trait is employed, the victims often suffer
a special kind of harm, in the form of stigma, insult and disrespect.
Leveling benefits down after such a harm has been inflicted is often
inadequate: it equalizes tangible benefits but leaves the special harm
unremedied.  In a real sense, it adds injury (the denial of benefits) to
                                           
85Raz seems to suggest a negative answer, though he does not specifically address what
I call “impure” equality rights:
It is only the effect of other principles which can explain our preference for
giving the benefit to those who lack it to denying it to those who have it.  This
preference cannot be explained on the basis of the egalitarian principles
themselves.
Raz, supra note 22=, at 227.
86An interesting example is the enactment of the Equal Pay Act.  Apparently employers
wanted the freedom to reduce wages to comply with the Act.  Instead, Congress
postponed the effective date of the Act for a year.  “This will give time for unions,
employers, and employees to make adjustments or changes in the job classifications,
wage rates, and so forth, if necessary.”  Congressional Record, 8687, House, May 23,
1963 (Remarks of Congressman Griffin).
87This is not to say, however, that impure equality rights are only defensible when the
person under the duty to rectify the inequality is the person who created the inequality.
For example, government might also have a duty to rectify inequalities that are not of its
own making, such as private discrimination, or natural inequalities in talents.  And this
duty could be a duty to level up.
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insult.88  Leveling up, by contrast, at least offers the salve of tangible
benefits.
When a positive right is violated, however, the injury often consists
entirely of the inequality of tangible benefits.  For example, if students in
poor school districts have the right to educational resources equal to those
available to students in the wealthiest districts of the state, then the injury
from inequality might be the unequal educational opportunity that such
unequal resources often create.  Leveling down might adequately redress
that concern.89
4. Equality of respect
One of the most important and most widely recognized egalitarian
norms is the fundamental duty of equal respect and concern.  Ronald
Dworkin has most famously insisted that government must show equal
concern for the interests of all citizens.90 However, even libertarian theorist
Robert Nozick appears to recognize a variant of the principle.91
Many different versions of this norm are possible.  A duty of equal
concern might be owed only by government, or also by employers, or
indeed (in certain respects) by all persons.  With respect to government, the
duty might merely be a procedural requirement, that all citizens have an
equal right to elect representatives.  Or it might include a more substantive
duty of representatives and other government officials to consider the
interests of all citizens equally when enacting legislation or adopting
administrative rules.  And it might include a duty to provide an
appropriately “neutral” or “public interest” justification of any distinctions
in treatment.
                                           
88See note 93, infra.
89On the other hand, the concern could be broader, namely, a belief that the
opportunities already being offered in wealthy districts should be granted to the poor.  In
that case, leveling up could be required.  (If the right to equal educational spending were
constitutionalized, it might forbid the state from adopting a formula requiring wealthier
districts to lower their spending, a formula that might save the state money compared to
the state subsidizing the poorer districts.)
90See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 227-228 (1977).  For discussion, see
Simons, supra note 48=, at 480 n. 229
91Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 223 (1974) (emphasis original):
That differences in treatment need to be justified does fit contemporary
governments.  Here [unlike the situation of private persons, who are entitled to
transfer property as they wish,] there is a centralized process treating all, with
no entitlement to bestow treatment according to whim.
Of course, since Nozick would radically limit the legitimate domain of government
decisions, the actual scope of his principle would be much narrower than the scope of
Dworkin’s.
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The notion of equal concern is especially valuable because it usually
embodies a deeper conceptions of equality than the superficial conception
of equalizing material benefits or burdens.92  For example, if an employer
fires pregnant women who are still able to perform their jobs, the employer
treats all nonpregnant people the same, and does not explicitly treat men
and women differently; but if an employer equally sensitive to the interests
of women and men would not adopt such a policy, then the policy violates
a deeper egalitarian norm.  If a city closes a swimming pool rather than
desegregating it, the city treats blacks and whites “equally” only in a
superficial sense, if the motivation is to avoid integration and the action
stigmatizes blacks.93
As these examples illustrate, the duty to show equal concern and
respect can help explain why discriminatory motivations, and also
expressions of selective sympathy,94 can violate egalitarian norms, even
when the tangible treatments to which such a motivation or selective
sympathy gives rise are equal.  However, the application of egalitarian
norms to motives and reasons for action creates a difficulty.  I have argued
that equality is a distinctively flexible norm: normally the decisionmaker
may either “level up” or “level down” the benefits or burdens at issue, in
order to rectify, or avoid creating, the inequality.  But how is such
flexibility possible when the tangible treatments themselves might be equal?
How can an egalitarian norm be appropriately flexible when the norm takes
the form of a prohibition on acting with discriminatory intent or acting
based on a discriminatory stereotype?
One possible answer is that any form of tangible treatment that a
nondiscriminatory decisionmaker could have produced is appropriately
respectful of equality.  If a nondiscriminatory employer could have adopted
a blanket policy of firing pregnant employees, then the policy is consistent
with equality.  If the employer could have adopted a different policy, of
always examining ability case-by-case, then that policy, too, would be
                                           
92Dworkin draws such a distinction, between (superficial) “equal treatment” and
(deeper) “equal concern” or “treatment as an equal”:
If I have two children, and one is dying from a disease that is making the other
uncomfortable, I do not show equal conern if I flip a coin to decide which shall
have the remaining dose of a drug.  This shows that the right to treatment as an
equal is fundamental, and the right to equal treatment, derivative.  In some
circumstances the right to treatment as an equal will entail a right to equal
treatment, but not, by any means, in all circumstances.
Dworkin, supra note 89=, at 227.
93See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), and discussion in Simons, supra note
48=, at 431-433.  These observations explain why Peters’ criticism of Palmer , supra
note 1=, at 1263 n. 84, does not prove his point that racial discrimination is not
essentially concerned with equal treatment.
94On the notion of selective sympathy and selective indifference, see Kenneth W.
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463, = (1992) (also citing sources).
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consistent with equality.  And the range of possible choices reflects the
flexibility of equality.
But this answer is inadequate.  For one thing, it presumes that
possible consistency with egalitarian motives is sufficient; yet we might
support a stronger egalitarian principle, requiring that any policy actually
produced by a discriminatory motive is invalid unless it would (and not
merely could) have been adopted by the employer if the employer had not
responded to prejudice.95  More importantly, the variety of possible results
of showing equal concern and respect does not express the right type of
flexibility.  Rather, given that the relevant equality norm is a duty to show
equal concern and respect, the relevant flexibility is as follows: Either (1)
show more concern for the previously disfavored group (thus “leveling up”
your concern to the level you showed the favored groups) or (2) show less
concern for the previously favored group (thus “leveling down” your
concern to the level you showed the disfavored groups).96
However, this answer, though analytically correct, is problematic in
at least two ways.  First, it is difficult to render operational the idea of
“leveling up” or “leveling down” an affective or motivational state, such as
the state of “concern” for others’ interests.  Any attempted legal expression
of this idea might therefore need to use certain crude surrogates (such as a
legal rule’s explicit use of discriminatory criteria, or a decisionmaker’s
“intent” to harm a disfavored group).  Second, in principle it might seem
troubling that a decisionmaker could satisfy its egalitarian duties by a “race
to the bottom,” treating all citizens with equal, but equally offensive,
disrespect.
But we should not shrink from this last conclusion.  It is indeed
what equality permits.  At the same time, as a practical matter, a
democratically elected government is unlikely to show pervasive disrespect
for all of its citizens.97  The temptation, or need, to play at least some
“favorites” will mitigate any risk of leveling all the way down.98
Consider a concrete example.  Suppose a legislature enacts a
veterans’ preference in employment which, because of the past exclusion of
women from the military, inures almost entirely to the benefit of males.99
The policy was designed to express thanks to citizens who gave unselfishly
to their nation, at great personal sacrifice.  But it arguably demonstrates
                                           
95Even this conception poses significant difficulties.  See David Strauss: Discriminatory
Intent and The Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, = (1989).
96Of course, intermediate possibilities are also possible.  If one measures “concern”
literally in terms of time and attention, then the decisionmaker has a fixed amount of
concern to “distribute,” and might thus need to decrease somewhat the “concern”
previously showed to his favorites and to increase somewhat the “concern” previously
shown to those least favored.
97See note 226= infra [Justice Jackson’s concurrence].
98Moreover, when the question is what remedy a decisionmaker should provide when he
has shown unequal respect to different groups, it is plausible to recognize an “impure”
equality right, requiring him to level up the disfavored group.  See prior section.
99See note 46=, supra.
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less respect for those citizens (predominantly women) who sacrificed by
working in the defense industry during wartime.  To accomplish equality,
government might offer similar preferences to such citizens.  Alternatively,
it might abolish all such preferences.  The latter might, in some sense, show
less respect for both groups of citizens (inasmuch as it fails to reward their
unusual sacrifices), but it is consistent with equality, and it does not show
serious disrespect to anyone.100  A wide range of government and personal
decisions are consistent with the minimal respect that a decisionmaker
owes to those affected by her decision.
And that prompts a final point.  The idea of disrespect itself can be
understood in either a noncomparative or a comparative sense.  I have been
discussing the noncomparative sense: disrespect towards X is evaluated
without reference to how others are treated.  But the idea can also take on
a comparative meaning: essential to the idea of treating X with disrespect is
a failure to treat X as having equal status with other persons in a relevant
community.101  On this view, the term “equal” in “a right to equal respect”
is otiose.
C. What equality is not
We have considered what equality is.  To clarify the concept, and to
dispel some possible confusions, let us turn to what equality is not.
1.  Accurate implementation of a rule (or “lexical equality”)
Equality principles seem to be implicated when a rule, requiring a
particular treatment of a class of persons, is so implemented that some but
not all members of the class receive the required treatment.  This section
will explain why the duty to implement a rule accurately according to its
terms does not ordinarily express a genuine egalitarian norm.  (I will note
some caveats, however, in a later section.102)
The example in (1A) was a bit unusual: the equal entitlements of
Bonnie and Clyde derive from distinct promises.  Example (1B) is even
                                           
100One difficulty with this example is that jobs are a scarce resource: giving a job
preference to one, two, or no groups of citizens affects the job prospects of others who
are not entitled to the preference.  To avoid this difficulty, imagine that the government
provides medals or symbolic awards to citizens who have made sacrifices.  Then it is
easier to see how giving awards to two groups rather than none shows more “respect”
for citizens generally.  (Even here, to be sure, the resource is not unlimited.  Giving
awards to all citizens might so debase the award that its value would be entirely lost.)
101See Richard McAdams,  Cooperation and Conflict: the Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003, 1044-1049
(1995)(explaining race discrimination as a process by which a racial group seeks to
produce status for itself by lowering another group’s status).
102See Section D.1=, infra.
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more extreme: the noncomparative rules creating Jones’ and Smith’s
separate entitlements have almost nothing to do with one another.
But more commonplace, and more troublesome, is the situation in
which a rule, with general criteria of application, is to be implemented.  If
the rule is unequally implemented, is that inequality a genuine violation of
egalitarian norms?  If so, do the terms of the rule themselves explain the
nature and scope of the violation?  Or is some other principle at work?
Consider a variation on (1A):
(3A)  I promise that all of my children will receive dessert if they
finish their dinner.
In this variation, rather than referring to particular individuals, the
entitlement is stated in more general or "universal"103 terms.
Suppose both finish their dinner, but I give dessert only to Bonnie.
Clyde obviously has a noncomparative claim by virtue of (3A).  But does
he have a comparative claim, a genuine claim that an equality norm was
violated?
Consider another example, from Peters’ article.
(3B) In a lottery, two winning tickets are issued, entitling each
bearer to a $500,000 prize.  Ms. Lucky, holding one of the winning
tickets, goes to collect her winnings and incorrectly receives a
check for $600,000.  The next day, Mr. Unlucky, holding the other
winning ticket, goes to collect his winnings and receives a check for
$500,000, the correct amount.104
Here, the rules entitle both Lucky and Unlucky to $500,000, but Lucky has
received more.  Does Unlucky have an equality claim to receive what
Lucky has received?
More generally, the question concerns rules or principles of the
following form:
(3)  All T’s shall receive B.
And the question arises: suppose some T’s receive B, while other T’s do
not?105  Does this unequal distribution of treatments to which all members
of T are entitled constitute a genuine violation of equality norms?
The question has two facets.  If the distribution is incorrect in
giving some a lesser benefit than they deserve, then those who incorrectly
fail to obtain their entitlements are likely to complain of being unequally
                                           
103The relevant "universe" can be qualified or limited, however.  It need not include all
persons.  See Simons, supra note 48=, at 454-455 n. 153.
104Peters, supra note 1=, at 1246-1247.
105More precisely, we must suppose that at least one person with trait T receives B
while at least one person with trait T does not.
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disfavored relative to those who are treated correctly.  (Thus, in (3A),
Clyde will complain that he was incorrectly deprived of a dessert that
similarly entitled Bonnie actually received.)  Let us call this a claim of
incorrect deprivation.  If the distribution is incorrect in giving some a
greater benefit than they deserve, then others who receive the correct
treatment might complain of being unequally disfavored relative to those
who are treated incorrectly and with undue largesse.  (Thus, in (3B), Mr.
Unlucky will complain that similarly entitled Ms. Lucky incorrectly
received a lottery windfall while Unlucky only received the face amount of
his ticket.)  This is a claim of incorrect beneficence.106
Typically, the unequal implementation of general criteria in rules
does not violate genuine egalitarian norms because ordinarily, rules
requiring specified forms of treatment to members of a class are
noncomparative in inspiration.  The reason for the rule or principle
normally is to provide a form of treatment B to any person with trait T,
considered individually and separately from other persons.  In example
(3A), each child is entitled to dessert if she finishes dinner, without regard
to how other children are treated.  If both finish dinner and only one
obtains dessert, the basic complaint of the other is noncomparative, not
comparative.  In (3B), anyone who presents a winning lottery ticket is
entitled to $500,000.107  Although Lucky obtained more than she deserves,
Unlucky probably has no complaint.  Unlucky probably has no comparative
right to equal treatment, and Unlucky is not a victim of noncomparative
injustice, for he received what he deserves.108
Moreover, the correctness of this basic answer is confirmed by an
important observation: a comparative right to equal treatment need not
embody any rule or generalization at all.  Instead, a small number of
uniquely identified individuals might hold a comparative right.  (Consider a
                                           
106In (3), “B” can refer to a burden instead of a benefit.  In that case, the observations in
the last parenthetical should be appropriately modified, by characterizing the relevant
benefit as relief from a burden.  Incorrect deprivation would be a case in which a burden
was incorrectly imposed (or was excessive).  Incorrect beneficence would be a case in
which the burden, incorrectly, was not imposed (or was too light).
Although Peters addresses both types of problems, Peters, supra note 1=, at
1212, his main focus is the second problem, incorrect beneficence.  Here, he says,
“prescriptive” equality purports to provide a reason for treating the claimant wrongly, a
reason that the nonegalitarian rule does not itself provide.  By contrast, he believes that
the nonegalitarian rule itself suffices to explain what is wrong in the first problem,
incorrect deprivation.  Id. at 1226.
107Following Peters’ original example, I put aside the complication that the amount
each person receives might depend on the number of lottery winners.  On the question
whether a competitive good should, for that reason alone, count as a comparative right,
see text at notes = infra. =discuss?=
108Peters characterizes the treatment of Lucky as not just incorrect, but “unjust.”  Peters,
supra note 1=, at =.  This conclusion is difficult to understand, insofar as Peters does not
relate that “injustice” to any person’s suffering a detriment or wrong.  (Such an
argument would, however, be possible: the distribution of the excess to Lucky makes
fewer lottery funds available to other lottery winners or to public projects that the lottery
program finances.)
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parent’s commitment to show the same concern for the welfare of her
adopted child as she shows to her natural child.109)  Of course, most
comparative equality rights do employ general criteria.  (Consider Rawls’
difference principle, or the principle that blacks shall not be disadvantaged
relative to whites.)  But even when the right is held by groups that are
defined by general criteria, the point of the right might be to ensure equality
despite significant differences between group members, not to ensure
equality because group members are descriptively equal in certain respects
that the group trait (T) identifies.110  In philosophical terms, normative
equality need not supervene upon descriptive equality.111
Another example is the progressive extension of the right to vote
and other fundamental rights to broader categories of citizens in modern
nations.  This extension could, to be sure, rely on assertions of descriptive
equality--that all citizens are sufficiently equal in their capacity to vote
intelligently, or in their interest in those matters governed by the elected
officials.  But it could also reflect a social commitment to treat virtually all
citizens as equal in status, notwithstanding significant actual differences in
education, experience, personal interest, and other characteristics that
would often be thought relevant.  And the basis of that egalitarian social
commitment might be the desire to create and define a moral and political
community.
Before leaving the question whether unequal implementation of a
rule is a genuine violation of equality norms, it is worth noticing the
remarkable amount of discussion that the question has provoked.112
Egalitarian norms in law and morality have their greatest social importance
in the realms of nondiscrimination rights and distributive justice.  Why
would distinguished commentators expend so much time and effort on the
                                           
109But does such a case implicitly rest on a general principle, “Show equal concern to
all of my own children, whether natural or adopted”?  Perhaps, but it need not.  It could
simply reflect a commitment to treat adopted Andrew and natural Nathan with equal
concern, without displaying any similar commitment as to future children.  (For
example, a parent might admit that she would not be able to show as much concern for
additional children as she shows for the first two.)
110By contrast, lexical equality, or equality of entitlements as a consequence of
implementing a rule, typically does follow from providing specified treatment to all
persons with a specified descriptive trait, for rules often identify a trait that is a
necessary and sufficient condition of entitlement (as in (3A) and (3B)).
111“To say that considerations of one kind (e.g. the mental) supervene on those of
another kind (e.g. the physical) is to say that there are, or can be, no differences in the
first kind without there being differences in the second kind.”  Paul Teller,
Supervenience, in A Companion to Metaphysics 484 (Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa eds.
1995).
112See, e.g., John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 59 (1987); Greenawalt, supra
note 1=; Peters, supra note 1=; Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, especially
Chs. 9, 10.  For some of the extensive philosophical literature, see the sources cited in
id., Ch. 9.
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prosaic question of the fairness of treatments that are “unequal” as
measured by the terms of an ordinary rule?113
Part of the explanation, I think, is that this question is believed to be
closely connected to other important egalitarian issues.  In particular, many
assume that all equality claims are instances of a perfectly general formal
concept to the effect that “likes should be treated alike,” that “the similarly
situated should be treated similarly,” or that “equals should be treated
equally.”  A brief detour into this territory is therefore worthwhile.
Unhappily, this formal concept of equality, “treat likes alike” (or
“TLA” for short), is highly misleading, because it is fatally ambiguous.  It
can have nontrivial meaning, for it can express what I have called a
demand-for-reasons equality claim.  Thus, if (apart from any promises) one
child is permitted dessert and the other is not, the second is likely to ask for
an explanation.  She can easily place her complaint within the framework of
TLA.  A precocious child, she will proclaim: “My sibling and I are equals in
every relevant respect.  Whatever reason you might have had for letting
him have dessert applies to me as well.  You must therefore treat us
equally.”114  Of course, the parent might well have sufficient reason to treat
them differently, or this might be a context in which he need not give any
reason.  But it is coherent, at least, for the disappointed child to complain
that her parent failed to treat likes alike in this sense.
However, TLA can, and often does, express only the derivative
idea that a rule should be applied according to its terms.  “Treat likes alike”
then means only “Treat likes (those who are supposed to be treated equally
according to the terms of a rule), alike (according to the terms of the
                                           
113Peters does acknowledge that the “prescriptive equality” he discusses is only one of
many kinds of arguments that might be called egalitarian.  Peters, supra note 1=, at
1214.  Greenawalt makes a similar acknowledgement.  Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at
1274, 1278 n. 42.  See also id. at 1274 (suggesting that, relative to “the major issues
about equality in Western societies... the subject of Professor Peters’ inquiry is narrow
and comparatively insignificant.  But it is definitely worth our attention.”).
However, Peters also leaves the unmistakeable impression that he is hostile to
any genuine comparative equality rights.  Thus, he employs the term “nonegalitarian
justice” to encompass all justice principles other than “prescriptive equality.”  Peters, at
1228.  This hardly leaves much room for egalitarian principles other than “prescriptive
equality.”  Moreover, by treating even racial discrimination and Rawls’ difference
principle as instances of “nonegalitarian justice” in the noncomparative sense, see id. at
1254-1255, 1259-1262, Peters confirms the impression that he would not endorse any
comparative conception of equality other than “prescriptive equality” (which he
ultimately rejects).  See also id. at 1263-1264 n. 84 (simply rejecting the comparative
equality component of a state constitutional right to a “thorough and efficient”
education, a component that requires some equalization between poor and wealthy
districts, and claiming that only the noncomparative component of the right is
important).
114For a thoughtful discussion of the complexities of a “presumption of equality”
requiring equal treatment unless reasons are shown for unequal treatment, see Westen,
Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, Ch. 10.
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rule).”  In short, “follow the rule.”  This lexical115 conception of equality is
derivative, for the equality that it identifies is merely a byproduct of the
duty to implement a rule accurately.116
The ambiguity of TLA is extremely unfortunate, for only the first
meaning, “give a reason for differential treatment,” expresses a genuine
equality norm.  I therefore partially agree with Westen’s early conclusion
that “equality” is a misleading and often empty concept, and should be
“banished” from our discourse117–that is, I agree that the TLA conception
of equality should be discarded.
But is my conclusion too hasty?  Many seem to believe that the
TLA principle has genuine meaning.  Although this principle requires an
extraneous standard, perhaps it is a meaningful egalitarian norm once that
extraneous content is supplied.  On this view, for example, “the equally
guilty should receive the same punishment” is an egalitarian principle.118
I disagree.  The external standard that TLA embodies is often a
noncomparative rule, and the equality that that rule “requires” is then
incidental.  Thus, the argument that those who are equally guilty should
receive the same punishment is not a genuine egalitarian argument if it
simply invokes the noncomparative rule that each person should receive
                                           
115See Simons, supra note 48=, at 393-403; Westen, A Response, supra note 11=, 83
Colum. L. Rev. at 1188-1190.  See also David Lyons, On Formal Justice, 58 Cornell L.
Rev. 833, = (1973).
116Greenawalt reaches a similar conclusion.  He agrees that the formal principle,
“equals should be treated equally,” can be empty, and thinks this is a good reason for
ascribing to it the content of “prescriptive equality,” namely, “the idea that giving a
form of treatment to one equal is a reason to give the same treatment to another.”
Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at 1268.  I disagree, however, that the appropriate content of
TLA is this historical or precedential principle of “prescriptive” equality.  See text at
notes 111-118= infra.
Westen’s detailed analysis of the “formal” principle of equality, Westen,
Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, Ch. 9, partially supports my analysis of TLA,
though I believe he gives insufficient attention to the distinction between comparative
and noncomparative principles.  See note = infra.
Even Joel Feinberg, the originator of that distinction, provides a regrettably
ambiguous analysis of “likes should be treated alike.”  See Westen, Speaking of
Equality, supra note 3=, at 135 n. 11; Simons, supra note 48=, at 401 n. 25.
117Westen, Empty Idea, supra note 2=, at 542.
118See Barry, supra note 7=, at 323.  See also Allen Buchanon, Distributive Justice,
Encyclopedia of Philosophy = (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
Westen carefully examines H.L.A. Hart’s articulation of this view in Westen,
Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, at 225-229.  Much of Westen’s analysis is
persuasive, but again, he understates the importance of the comparative/
noncomparative distinction.  Thus, Westen’s conclusion (that the “formal” principle or
TLA adds nothing to the “material” principle of justice) is valid when TLA simply
reflects the notion of implementing a noncomparative rule.  But it is not valid when
TLA is a way of expressing an egalitarian, comparative metaprinciple, or when the
material principle is itself comparative.
Page 36 Egalitarian Logic: A Defense September 1, 1999
punishment in proportion to his guilt.119  In that case, it is no more
egalitarian than the argument that those who are equally entitled under the
tax law to a business tax deduction of $497 should receive the same
deduction, or the argument that those who make promises should keep
them, or indeed any other argument for consistent implementation of a rule.
Similarly, equality should not be conflated with the notion of
“giving a person his due” in the Aristotelian sense.  For what is “due” or
owing to a person could be honoring either a comparative or a
noncomparative right.120  The Aristotelian formulation conceals the
distinction.
Finally, understanding normative equality as accurate
implementation of a rule is a mistake, even when the rule in question is a
comparative equality principle.  For what warrants characterizing a rule as
egalitarian is not consistent implementation as such, but rather the content
of the rule.  “Don’t discriminate against women” is an equality right
because it prohibits a particular form of inequality.  If the decisionmaker
were to act inconsistently, honoring this nondiscrimination norm as to some
women but then breaching it as to others, then it would be the breach, not
the inconsistency, that principally offends equality norms.121
2.  Consistent departure from a rule
The Lucky/ Unlucky lottery example (see (3B), above) is an
instance of incorrect beneficence.  Concern about this form of lexical
inequality might seem to favor a conception of equality as requiring
consistent departure from a rule: if one person (e.g. Lucky) gets a windfall,
then so should others similarly situated (e.g. Unlucky).122
                                           
119Of course, the argument sometimes is meant to invoke an egalitarian metaprinciple,
such as a requirement of impartiality or freedom from bias in administering criminal
punishment.
This egalitarian metaprinciple has played an important role in recent
sentencing reform movements.  A major impetus behind the recent movements toward
fixed sentencing and the abolition of probation and parole is a concern that under
indeterminate sentencing, judge A and judge B would impose dramatically different
punishments on the same set of facts.  More rigid sentencing policies reduce that form of
inequality (though they create other problems, including harshness and a crude
insensitivity to the facts of individual cases).  Because, under the old system, judge A
and judge B had discretion, it was often not possible to criticize either judge’s decision
as an erroneous application of the rule, “impose punishment in accordance with guilt.”
120See Kane, supra note =, at =.
121This is subject to the caveats noted in section D.1= infra.  The requirement of
consistency could itself express an egalitarian norm, but it would be a different norm
than the duty not to discriminate against women; for example, it might be a duty to
explain to the second woman why she was not protected by the antidiscrimination norm
when the first woman was protected.
122Usually, as in his Lucky/ Unlucky example, Peters is concerned about incorrect
beneficence, and is therefore arguing for consistent departure from a rule.  But
occasionally, he is concerned about incorrect deprivation.  Concern about the latter form
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But it is not plausible to think that equality, as a general matter,
requires consistent departure from a rule.  For then the metaprinciple
would be: if you depart from a rule as to Smith, depart from the rule as to
Jones.  This is a strange principle.  It suggests, in the Lucky/Unlucky
example, that the windfall to Lucky justifies any form of incorrect
treatment of Unlucky–from a larger windfall, to the same windfall, to
giving Unlucky even less than the face amount of the lottery ticket.123
To justify an equality claim based on Lucky’s treatment, one must
explain why Unlucky should get the same incorrect treatment as Lucky.
The equality right most likely to provide such an explanation, I think, is a
demand-for-reasons equality claim.  Unlucky would assert: “Whatever
reasons you had for exempting Lucky from your usual rules must apply to
me, too.”  This, in form at least, is a plausible egalitarian complaint.  But it
is not equivalent to a requirement that a decisionmaker depart from a rule
consistently (unless “consistency” is given this more limited meaning of
“treat us the same if your reasons for exempting the other also apply to
me”).  Of course, although this is a plausible complaint, often a satisfactory
answer would be this: the decisionmaker made a regrettable mistake in the
case of Lucky, and government is obliged to justify its deliberate decisions
but not its mistakes.124
3.  Limited to historical differences in treatment
After rejecting formal equality as tautological and meaningless,
Peters turns to what he calls the “prescriptive” conception of equality,
which he believes “is at the core of the most interesting and troublesome
kinds of egalitarian arguments.”125  It would be more accurate, I think, to
call this conception “precedential.”  But whatever the label, this conception
                                                                                                                                 
of lexical inequality presumably militates in favor of consistent implementation of a
rule.
In Speaking of Equality, Westen distinguishes two ways in which we might
treat people “equally” pursuant to a relevant rule.  The rule can serve directly as a
prescriptive standard of comparison, so that “A and B are equal” means that they have
equal entitlements under a rule.  Or the rule can serve indirectly as a baseline for
measuring whether actual treatments are identical or nonidentical in the extent to which
they depart from what the rule says they should be.  In the second case, “A and B are
equal” means either that both have received what they are entitled to under a baseline
rule, or that both have been denied what they are entitled to under that rule.  Westen,
supra note 3=, at 86-92, 189-190.  This second formulation seems to include the
argument I am now discussing.
123Indeed, Peters makes a similar reductio ad absurdum argument, asserting that
(incorrectly) giving Unlucky what Lucky (incorrectly) received treats Unlucky equally to
Lucky but unequally to everyone else who has been or ever will be treated correctly.
Peters, supra note 1=, at 1249.
124But government might need to justify its choice of systems when one predictably
leads to more errors than another. =cite=
125Peters, supra note 1=, at 1214.
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of equality is much too narrow to express the many legitimate ways in
which equality principles are employed in legal and moral discourse.
According to Peters, the nontautological sense of equality,126 which
he calls “prescriptive” equality (PE), “is the principle that the bare fact that
a person has been treated in a certain way is a reason in itself for treating
another, identically situated person in the same way.”127  This conception
presupposes the historical successive treatments of at least two different
individuals.  (It also seems to derive  from Peters’ interest in the subject of
precedential constraint.128)  Peters’ terminology here is unfortunate, for his
“prescriptive” equality describes only a narrow subcategory of the cases in
which equality is invoked normatively (and non-tautologically) in legal and
moral argument.
Peters’ analysis, including his discussion of the Lucky/ Unlucky
example (3B, above), overemphasizes history.129  The analysis presupposes
that one person (Lucky) actually, previously received beneficial treatment
relative to another person (Unlucky).  But this is an extremely narrow
conception of an equality right, for two reasons.  First, equality principles
can apply even when a person or class has been burdened and no other
person or class has received a lesser burden (or a greater benefit).  Second,
equality principles can apply without regard to the historical sequence of
treatments between advantaged and disadvantaged persons or classes.
With respect to the first point, consider this example.  Sam is an
employer’s only employee, and the employer discharges him because of his
gender or his race.  Sam still has a coherent equality claim, because the
criterion used would result in invidious unequal treatment if applied more
broadly, to all persons potentially subject to it.  Such a hypothetical
discrimination claim is perfectly sensible, and is indeed one viable type of
Title VII claim.130
Peters disagrees.  Several times, he uses what we might call the
“single person reductio” in an attempt to show that the applicable principle
does not sound in equality.131  Thus, discussing Yick Wo, he asserts that
                                           
126Peters explains that his analysis differs from Westen’s as follows.   A special
nontautological equality problem exists, according to Peters, when X correctly gets a
benefit but Y is incorrectly denied it.  This isn’t just a case of Y being wrongly denied a
benefit, for someone with no greater entitlement to the benefit has been awarded it.
Peters, supra note 1=, at 1220.  Peters misunderstands Westen here.  Westen no longer
views all equality arguments as meaningless tautologies.  Westen, Speaking of Equality,
supra note 3=, at xx.  Moreover, Westen does recognize the subcategory of equality
principles that Peters denominates “prescriptive.”  See note 24= supra.
127Id. at 1223 (emphasis omitted).
128Peters, Foolish Consistency, supra note 35=, at =.  See also Peters, supra note 1=, at
1226 n. 32, 1263.
129Peters explains in his conclusion: “My argument against prescriptive equality has
really been an argument in favor of making every decision on its own merits, of treating
people the way justice dictates that they be treated, regardless of how someone else has
been treated in the past.”  Peters, supra note 1=, at 1264.
130=cites.  See Simons, supra note 48=, at 418-420.
131Peters, supra note 1=, at 1220, =.
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the wrong doesn’t depend upon the comparative treatment of two or more
persons; the rule that irrelevant treatment is impermissible has meaning
even if only one person in the universe ever has been denied a permit.132
But Peters fails to recognize that equality principles can apply even when
only one person has been denied a benefit.133  The substantive reason why
the treatment is wrong in Yick Wo is the use of an invidious (and not
merely “irrelevant”) racial trait.  And the use of the trait is wrong precisely
because it violates egalitarian principles.134
Second, Peters also claims that the relative timing of the treatment
of Lucky and Unlucky matters to the applicability of an equality right.  If
Lucky happens to receive her windfall lottery ticket first, Unlucky has a
“prescriptive” equality claim; while if Unlucky receives his check first and
Lucky’s check has not yet been issued, then Unlucky has no such claim.
But, Peters objects, this means that random chance dictates the applicability
of equality, a result that most would view as unjust.135
This argument is confused, and does not show that the sequence of
treatments necessarily affects the viability of a “prescriptive” equality claim.
If we consider the sequence of treatments after both have occurred, then it
does not much matter whether Lucky or Unlucky receives a check first.136
                                           
132Id. at 1220.
133Discussing Yick Wo, Peters asserts:
The Chinese applicants were treated wrongly not because they were treated
differently, or “unequally,” from the Caucasian applicants, but rather because
they were treated according to an irrelevant criterion (their race, or national
origin), regardless of how Caucasians were treated.
Id (emphasis added).
The underlined phrase reveals the fallacy in this argument.  If Caucasians, too,
were denied laundry permits, then it is quite unlikely that the criterion of race explains
why Chinese applicants were denied permits.  And, even if it turns out that the
Caucasian applicants were denied permits for other reasons, while racial prejudice really
was the actual reason for denying permits to Chinese, then the latter still amounts to an
equality problem, in this straightforward sense: if the Chinese applicants had been
Caucasian, then they would have received permits.  (Or if they would not have, racial
prejudice still provided the government with an additional reason for burdening the
Chinese applicants, a reason that made it more likely that government would burden
applicants on a racial basis.)
134To some extent, Greenawalt agrees with Peters’ “one person reductio” argument.  In
an attempt to show that the precedential conception of equality has independent
meaning, Greenawalt states: “[I]t may be a worse wrong if a white is given a benefit and
a black is denied the benefit because of race, than if the black is the only person
concerned and he is denied the benefit because of race.”  Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at
1278 n. 42.  Perhaps.  But the wrong isn’t much worse, if it is worse at all.  In any
event, a conception of equality that ignores the wrong in the latter case is sorely
deficient.  (Although Peters does not believe that the latter type of wrong presents an
equality issue, Greenawalt correctly disagrees.)
135Peters, supra note 1=, at 1252-1253.
136 As Peters concedes, if “prescriptive” equality demands that Unlucky also obtain a
windfall, this can be done by giving him the windfall initially (if his treatment was
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If, instead, we consider the sequence of treatments after only one has
received a check, then again, no viable “prescriptive” equality claim yet
exists in either case: for we do not know whether Unlucky will receive
what Lucky has received, or vice versa.  (And as Greenawalt points out, in
this second situation we might be able to predict how the other will be
treated; if so, we can evaluate the equality claim now, regardless of
sequence.137)
Consider a more realistic example.  Employer A, with several job
openings, first hires a white employee.  He then receives an application
from an equally qualified black, but does not hire her. Employer B first
receives an application from a black prospective employee, and declines to
hire her.  He then hires an equally qualified white.  Although there are
evidentiary differences between these two examples, nondiscrimination law
properly condemns each employer.
Why would Peters take this peculiarly historical perspective?
Perhaps because his argument is best addressed, not to egalitarian norms
generally, but to egalitarian rationales for the legal doctrine of precedent.
In emphasizing the actual history of treatment, and in insisting that two
unequal actual treatments must have occurred, Peters seems to be
extending the argument of an earlier article, in which he sought to show
that if a past precedent is unjust, a supposed right to equal treatment does
not justify following that precedent today.138  That specific argument about
precedent might indeed be correct.  Even if it is, however, it does not
undermine egalitarian arguments in other contexts.  In the context of
precedent, competing principles (including the importance of allowing the
law to evolve) might override the right to equal treatment.  But it hardly
follows that the equality right is conceptually incoherent or normatively
indefensible.139  For example, suppose a judge sentences equally
                                                                                                                                 
second) or by retrospectively giving him an additional check (if his treatment was first
and he initially received the correct amount).  Id. at 1226-1227 n. 33.
One small difference is the administrative cost of issuing a second check.  If the
solution to inequality is to level “Lucky” down to the correct level, a more serious
difference exists.  For it is often infeasible or wrong to deprive Lucky of a windfall she
has already received spent, but this is not the case if her treatment is second and we
intervene promptly.  (Similar problems arise if the issue is incorrect deprivation rather
than incorrect beneficence.)
137Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at 1272, 1282.  Greenawalt notes that this is more likely
to occur when we have two different decisionmakers (e.g., judge A predicts that judge B
will make a mistake); and usually, it is easier to see past mistakes than to predict future
ones; but still, in principle, “prescriptive” equality is not tied to the time sequence.  Id.
at 1282.
138Peters, Foolish Consistency, supra note 35=.
139Greenawalt agrees with Peters that prescriptive equality does not support the doctrine
of precedent, but he agrees for two special reasons.  First, the people involved in the two
cases are often not significantly related to one another, and Greenawalt believes that a
significant relationship is a precondition to applying prescriptive equality.  (For my
criticism of this requirement, see note 221= infra.)  Second, in civil cases, if one litigant
in the first case received better treatment than deserved, then the other litigant received
worse treatment than he deserved; so following the precedent in the name of equality
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responsible defendants J and K at different times.  Equality can have some
force in this context, even if, in the end, other legal or moral considerations
militate in favor of different treatment.140
Moreover, strictly speaking, precedent does not exemplify the value
of interpersonal equality at all.  Rather, precedent concerns intertemporal
equality, a form of equality that can apply to successive treatments even of
a single person over time.  Yet interpersonal equality is the far more
important egalitarian concern in morality and law.
Thus, suppose an administrator is deciding whether L should
receive a building permit for a certain type of construction.  Two years
later, L again requests a permit for the same type of construction.  Does
“equality” count as a reason for the administrator to decide both cases in
the same way?  In a sense, yes, but only in the sense that intertemporal
equality is desirable–e.g., to provide consistent application of principles
over time.  And insofar as it is also desirable that principles evolve or
change over time, the intertemporal equality principle loses force.
Of course, in the context of precedent, concerns about interpersonal
and intertemporal equality typically merge.  If M is denied a permit this
year while L received one last year based on similar facts, M can raise both
concerns.  But it is helpful to separate them analytically.  The worry about
interpersonal equality is, for example, that the administrator is biased
                                                                                                                                 
will give one of the litigants in the later case worse treatment than he deserves.
Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at 1289.  Although Greenawalt believes that prescriptive
equality has force when it results in giving people better treatment than they deserve, he
is agnostic about whether it has force when it results in giving people worse treatment.
140See Section D.4= infra.
Alexander makes a further argument purporting to show that the doctrine of
precedent does not express a defensible egalitarian norm.  In the context of precedent,
Alexander asserts that “the comparative justice [or equality] claim is actually stronger
for following a decision that is seriously wrong than for following a decision that is only
minimally wrong,” insofar as the winner in the present cases will be much better off
than her equally deserving but losing counterpart in the earlier case.  Alexander,
Constrained by Precedent, supra note 36=, at 11.  Although the noncomparative justice
reasons for following the earlier case are correspondingly weaker, the result is still that
we have the same overall balance of reasons for following seriously wrong past decisions
as for following minimally wrong past decisions.  But, Alexander notes, we do not in
fact believe that it is as important to follow seriously wrong past decisions.  Thus, he
concludes, we must not believe that intertemporal equality is a weighty value.  Id.
Alexander’s argument relies on a false premise.  It is not necessarily true that
the equality claim for following a seriously wrong precedent is especially strong.
Equality principles can be sensitive to differentials in wellbeing, but they need not be.
For example, they can depend more on the permissibility of criteria of distinction (as in
prohibitions of racial and gender discrimination).  In the context of precedent, the
equality norm might be this: Although a court has considerable discretion concerning
which principle of law to adopt in a case of first impression, equality demands that the
court have a substantial reason for not following a precedent.  This norm is based on
equality insofar as it requires an explanation for differences in treatment of those who
claim to be similarly situated.  Of course, such a norm might often be less weighty than
the need to correct a past mistake.  And that competing need is weightier the more
serious the past mistake.  But the equality norm requiring explanation can have a weight
that is insensitive to the seriousness of the past mistake.
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against M, or is showing favoritism toward L.  The worry about
intertemporal equality (even if the problem were only successive treatments
of L) is, for example, that the administrator is acting thoughtlessly or
without any meaningful standards at all.  In general, we are more
concerned about interpersonal than about intertemporal inequalities.  (If L
receives a permit in January, and M is denied a permit on similar facts in
February, we are normally more troubled than if L receives a permit in
January and L is denied one in February.)
To be sure, Peters’ conception of precedential equality sometimes
expresses a meaningful egalitarian claim, insofar as we might recognize a
right to a minimal explanation for any differential in treatment (historical or
otherwise).  But precedential equality is both too broad and much too
narrow to explain when the concept of equality is usefully employed in
legal and moral argument.  It is too broad: Peters errs in thinking that
precedential equality is a universal, and significant, principle.141  Not every
case of incorrect beneficence under a rule deserves multiplication.  And
conversely, precedential equality is far too narrow, for it does not
encompass nondiscrimination rights, distributive justice principles,
egalitarian constraints on the exercise of discretion, and many other
important contexts in which equality principles are properly invoked.
A final example of the inadequacy of precedential equality is Peters’
rather tortured analysis of Rawls’ difference principle.  Peters wants to
refute the objection that his approach requires the rejection of “so-called
egalitarian theories of justice such as Rawls’s.”142  According to Peters,
Rawls’ difference principle is largely safe from the criticism that it
expresses “prescriptive” equality, for the following reasons.  First, if an
unequal distribution of a social primary good (such as wealth) to Y but not
X will benefit the least advantaged, Rawls permits the inequality.  Peters
agrees that this need not express “prescriptive” equality, but only for a very
narrow reason: “the fact that X but not Y will invest the wealth in a socially
beneficial way means that X and Y are not identically entitled to the
wealth,” so “prescriptive” equality simply does not apply.143  Second, if
unequal distribution will not benefit the least advantaged, then Rawls
would require equal distribution between X and Y; but again, Peters finds a
narrow reason for concluding that the result need not express
“prescriptive” equality: “we now have no valid reason of nonegalitarian
justice (at least, none that Rawls would recognize) to give Y more wealth
than X.”144
But these rationalizations simply overlook the egalitarian point of
Rawls’ theory.  As a matter of justice, Rawls believes, we should create
                                           
141See Peters, supra note 1=, at 1250, n. 58 (“The prescriptive egalitarian holds that
unequal treatment of identically situated people, measured according to any legitimate
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unequal entitlements to wealth and income if (but only if) the inequalities
would benefit the worst off.  Peters calls this a principle of “nonegalitarian
justice” and points out that if the principle is applied according to its terms,
we need not rely on the dubious “prescriptive equality” conception.  But
Peters’ definitional moves cannot conceal the egalitarian content of the
principle.145
In the end,146 Peters cautiously concludes that Rawls’ theory “is
perfectly consistent with nonegalitarian justice in many, probably most,
situations in which it might be applied.”147  But he suggests that we must
closely examine “any legal, political, or moral theory that makes the proper
treatment of some people contingent upon the treatment given to others,”
since such a theory might be “grounded in a fiction.”148  Of course, Rawls’
Theory of Justice is such a theory.  It is remarkable that Peters can offer
only this contingent, uncertain judgment about whether the most important
political theory of this century passes the simple test of intelligibility.
4.  Only a prohibition on using irrelevant criteria
Do equality rights merely prohibit the use of irrelevant criteria?
And if so, are they really about equality at all?
Peters treats the most obvious instances of a right to equal
treatment (such as the prohibition on race or gender discrimination, or
Rawls’ difference principle) as exemplifying one type of nonegalitarian
right–namely, a right not to be disadvantaged based on an “irrelevant”
criterion.149  Indeed, his very statement of NEJ is in terms of “relevant”
criteria.150  But the relevance of relevance is much less than Peters believes.
                                           
145It is plausible to question whether what Rawls is concerned about is the inequality of
distribution of primary social goods among different social and economic classes, or
instead the need to give priority to the needs of those who are worst off.  In an important
sense, the latter interpretation is not egalitarian.  See Parfit, =; Temkin, supra note
38?=; =.  But this is not Peters’ point.
146In another argument, Peters conjures a scenario in which the difference principle
might incorporate “prescriptive” equality, and in which the principle should therefore,
he believes, be rejected.  He supposes essentially the Lucky/ Unlucky lottery ticket fact
pattern, and conjectures that the difference principle might support multiplying Lucky’s
windfall and providing it to Unlucky, as well.  Peters, supra note 1=, at 1261.  But, as
Peters might realize, id. at 1261 n. 80, Rawls never intended the difference principle to
apply to distributions that depart from what his theory requires.  Rather, he is concerned
to explain what people deserve in the first instance, as a result of implementing the basic
principles that would be chosen in the original position.  See Rawls, supra note 51=, at =
[on desert v. entitlement].
147Id. at 1262.
148Id.
149Peters, supra note 1=, at 1220, 1230 n. 38, 1254-55; 1259-1262.  See also Westen,
Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, at 120-121.
150See text at notes 29= supra.
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Irrelevance of a trait or reason is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for qualifying as an equality norm.
The prohibition of the use of a racial criterion in cases such as Yick
Wo reflects a comparative right.  To treat such a prohibition as simply
requiring that extraneous factors be ignored is to trivialize the reasons why
racial discrimination is illegal.  Racial discrimination expresses a profound
disrespect for the status of a minority group; the use of an arbitrary or
irrelevant criterion, without more, has no such meaning or effect.151
Among other things, Peters’ view does not permit us to explain why
discrimination against blacks might plausibly be seen as more troublesome
than preferential treatment of blacks.152
As another example, consider gender classifications.  Gender is
often at least minimally “rational” or relevant to permissible ends of
government.  For example, a gender-based criterion might loosely correlate
with whether a youth will drink and drive,153 or whether a wage-earner has
a dependent spouse.154  But, under the equal protection clause, the
government needs an especially strong reason before it may explicitly
differentiate women and men.  Relying on stereotypes, even stereotypes
that are substantially accurate, can perpetuate traditional gender roles.155
Even racial classifications are sometimes relevant to legitimate
government ends; their invalidity does not depend on their being irrelevant.
For example, in the context of peremptory challenges, race might well be a
relevant characteristic: black jurors as a group are more likely than white
jurors to question the credibility of the prosecution’s case.  But the
Supreme Court has reasonably concluded that the use of race even in this
context threatens to perpetuate highly inaccurate stereotypes and racist
views.156
Still, one might worry that nondiscrimination rights do not really
express equality insofar as they are negative rights, merely prohibiting
people from employing certain traits or considering certain types of reasons
                                           
151See, e.g., Paul Brest, ==; John Hart Ely, Democracy’s Distrust = (=).
152Peters does offer an explanation, suggesting that opponents of affirmative action
think race is always irrelevant, while proponents argue that a preference is “based on a
relevant criterion ... : the fact that the African-American business owner, due to
historical and sociological conditions, faces artificial obstacles to obtaining government
contracts that the Caucasian owner does not face.”  Peters, supra note 1=, at 1256 n. 66
(emphasis original). But it is unhelpful to describe this debate as a battle over which
nonegalitarian criterion of relevance to use.  Rather, each criterion expresses a different
egalitarian norm: the opponents argue that a relative preference unfairly distributes
benefits unequally based on race; the proponents argue that a relative preference fairly
distributes benefits in order to promote equal opportunity or diversity or to redress
historical inequality.
153Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
154See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
155See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, = (1996).
156Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, = (1986).  See also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B.,
511 U.S. 127 (1994)(applying Batson to prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges).
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in their distributional decisions.  Perhaps such rights do not so much
require equality as forbid acting for certain reasons.  Perhaps they focus,
not on the nature or scope of the resulting inequality, but instead on the
harm (such as stigma) that any use of the impermissible trait produces.157
On this view, nondiscrimination rights are not centrally concerned with
equality at all.
This view is mistaken.  Nondiscrimination rights are indeed
centrally concerned with equality.  The stigmatic harms that race and sex
discrimination cause are often an expression of prejudice, hostility, spite,
and disrespect.  To put the matter in the most literal egalitarian terms, these
harms express the discriminator’s desire to distribute respect and esteem
unequally.  To be sure, the inequality in tangible benefits that a
discriminatory decision brings about might be less troublesome than the
prejudiced attitude the discriminator expresses or the insult the victim feels.
If a black employee had the choice whether to suffer an economic loss due
to an employer’s negligence or indifference, or instead to suffer a
significantly smaller economic loss due to an employer’s outright racial
hostility, the employee might well prefer the former.  Still, the inequality, in
tangible benefits or in status, does matter.158
Nevertheless, Peters’ discussion of irrelevance does point out a
serious ambiguity with those nondiscrimination rights that do prohibit
reliance on certain traits because they are irrelevant.  When are these rights
genuine equality rights?  The concept of “irrelevance” is opaque; it can
contain very different normative concerns.
Consider two examples:
(A) “Don’t discriminate based on race”
(B) “Don’t discriminate based on failure to offer a bribe”
(A) is an equality right (even if it is part of a larger view that race is
always irrelevant, i.e., that we should have a color-blind society).  But (B)
apparently is not.  Why not?
                                           
157See Peters, supra note 1=, at 1256: “The wrong of ... decisions [based on especially
odious criteria like race or gender] lies not in the difference in treatments that result
from them; it lies in the application of an especially harmful irrelevant criterion to
produce that difference.”
158This analysis might help explain why an equality claim against the employer in
examples (2D) and (2E), infra, can still be viable even if he promotes neither employee,
if his reason for promoting neither was based on a sexist desire to avoid promoting
Wilma.  (He might take this action to avoid detection of his sexist motivation.)
On first glance, forbidding the employer from “leveling down” or “multiplying
the wrong” in this way seems inconsistent with my earlier analysis.  But it is not.  An
equality right can be designed to equalize status, not merely (and sometimes not even) to
equalize tangible benefits.  See Section B.4= [Equality of Respect], supra.  Denying
promotion to both still treats Wilma worse than she would have been treated had she
been a man.  And it represents a distinct insult to her, possibly undermining her status
in the workplace in a way that denying promotion to Mark does not.  (Finally, an
equality right can be impure, thus requiring leveling up.)
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Formally, (A) and (B) are the same.  For each prohibits the use of a
classification based on a specified criterion.  But substantively, they differ.
Violation of (A) will lead to differentiation of benefits and burdens
according to race.  What is most troubling about such differentiation is not
the mere fact that an irrelevant criterion has been employed, but the social
significance of racial classifications (including subordination, caste, and
unequal status in the community), and the pervasive, severe consequences
of such classifications (including social friction, undermining of feelings of
self-worth and of a culture of mutual respect, and sometimes violence).
Violation of (B) ordinarily will not have a similar meaning or effect.
First, such a violation does not inevitably lead to inequality; it is at least
possible for a violation of (B) to cause no inequality, if no one offers a
bribe, or if all do.  Second, and more important, although it will be
unfortunate for society if bribery is rewarded, such a policy need not create
socially significant inequalities.  (On the other hand, such a result is
possible, if the government is corrupt and supported by a wealthy elite, and
if the bribery policy is part of a pervasive pattern of misgovernment.  In
that case, (B) could have an egalitarian justification and content.)
We need a substantive theory identifying which inequalities are
salient in our society in order to determine which “nondiscrimination”
rights of this sort (i.e., rights not to suffer because of “irrelevant” criteria)
are genuinely concerned with equality.  (Indeed, it would be clearer to
restate (B) as: “Don’t disadvantage me based on...” and to reserve the term
“nondiscrimination” for genuine comparative equality rights.)
Notice that (A) involves a trait, while (B) involves conduct.  So (A)
is more likely to result in entrenched, and therefore more troublesome,
equality.  But the difference is at best one of degree.  A trait can be
discriminatory and problematic without being entrenched (e.g. a one-time
government decision disadvantaging those with blue eyes).  And
conversely, discrimination against some forms of conduct or affecting some
types of personal interests is especially troublesome, e.g. discrimination
against those exercising equal protection fundamental interests such as the
right to vote, or those exercising the right to equal access to the criminal
and civil legal process.159
                                           
159=cites.  See Simons, supra note 48=, at 467-472.
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D. How equality operates
Having addressed the more basic criteria distinguishing egalitarian
from nonegalitarian principles, I turn to some additional, important features
of how egalitarian principles operate in moral and legal analysis.
1.  To govern unequal implementation of a rule (sometimes)
Above, I explained why the duty to implement a rule accurately
according to its terms expresses only “lexical equality”--a trivial, derivative,
tautological sense of equality.  However, in at least three circumstances,
unequal implementation of a rule can violate a genuine equality norm.
a. The scope of the rule expresses an invisible,
historical equality norm
The first circumstance or caveat is this: a genuine equality principle
could be part of the history, and could explain the current scope, of a
general rule of form (3).  Consider (3A), above, in which I promised that
all of my children would receive dessert if they finish their dinner, and
suppose the following history.   I initially created a more complex
entitlement under which my son’s entitlement to dessert depended on
different conditions than my daughter’s entitlement.  (Recall (1A).)  Then I
decided to reject that more complex entitlement, in part because I no
longer find those other conditions important, but in part because I give
weight to my children’s desire for equal treatment in this respect.  I might
agree with them that if a particular factor (finishing dinner) is sufficient
reason for one child to receive dessert, then (ordinarily) that factor should
also suffice for the other child to receive dessert.
Consider another example:
(3C) An employer once excluded blacks from applying for a
particular position.  The employer then decides, in response to
public pressure or through a change of heart, to accept applications
from all races, explicitly announcing, for the new job opening, “All
persons, without regard to race, are encouraged to apply.”
Notice that, when equality is part of the explanation of the current
scope of a noncomparative rule, the operative rule is still noncomparative.
We might say that equality in this setting is an invisible principle, while the
noncomparative rule is the visible principle.  The difference is important.  If
a principle is invisible, then it cannot directly operate to constrain decisions.
This is both good news and bad news for current recipients.  It is good
news, insofar as the decisionmaker could ordinarily satisfy the equality
principle by denying the relevant benefit to all.  Because that principle is
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invisible, however, this stingy response is unavailable.  For example, in
(3C), the embedded equality principle is: “Do not discriminate against
blacks with respect to accepting applications for the position.”  This
principle would be satisfied by abolishing the position, or by employing a
different, nonracial restriction on applications (e.g., limiting applications to
those with twenty years’ experience).  (3C) is therefore good news for the
previously excluded group, blacks, because it now grants them a
noncomparative right to apply for the position in question.160  But the
impotence of the embedded equality principle is also bad news for current
recipients.  If the decisionmaker changes his mind, abandons the rule in
(3C), and reverts to his racist ways, the invisible nondiscrimination
principle has no operative effect.
If we wish to make the equality principle visible, of course, we can
do so, by adopting it as an operative principle.  Instead of hoping that
employers adopt and maintain noncomparative rules that extend benefits to
blacks as well as whites, government might forbid racial discrimination by
employers.  Combining such a nondiscrimination rule with a job opening
still results in the  noncomparative rule (3A), but that entitlement is now
secure against a discriminatory reformulation.161
When does equality operate even as an invisible principle,
explaining the current scope of a noncomparative rule?  It is difficult to say.
On their face, all noncomparative rules employ general criteria.  This
generality is consistent with an embedded egalitarian norm, i.e., a desire to
create equality between subjects with respect to the benefit at issue.  But it
is also consistent with the nonegalitarian view that the classifying trait is the
most relevant and appropriate trait for conferring the benefit at issue.
So we need to look behind the face of the rule, to its purpose and
history.  At one extreme, suppose a case in which the decisionmaker never
expected more than one individual ever to be subject to the rule.162  In such
a case, the rule is entirely noncomparative in inspiration as well as
operation.  At the other extreme, suppose that the current scope of the rule
is in significant part due to efforts to overcome past inequalities.  “All adult
persons shall have the right to vote” in contemporary society does not
merely represent a determination that being an adult person is relevant to
                                           
160Compare Justice Scalia’s argument for limiting affirmative action to remedying
specific identified instances of past discrimination, a remedy that no longer requires any
reference to race at all.  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, =
(1989)(Scalia, J., concurring).  In effect, he argues for race being considered, not as a
comparative group right (blacks should be preferred to whites in certain respects), but as
a noncomparative individual right (all persons are entitled to a judicial remedy for an
individual rights violation; some blacks are so entitled).  Of course, his argument still
reflects the logic of comparative rights, insofar as the historical individual rights
violations of which blacks complain were themselves violations of the comparative right
not to suffer discrimination.
161These examples involve the operation of visible and invisible legal principles.
Similar problems can arise within a moral system that has either lexically ordered
principles or reasons with widely varying weights.
162=E.g., the federal law requiring ex-President Nixon to turn over his tapes? cite=
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voting (in the way, for example, that it is relevant to the size of hospital
beds).  It also, and more importantly, represents a social commitment not
to permit slavery, property qualifications, gender discrimination, or other
unjustifiable criteria to qualify this fundamental right of equal political
participation.163
This first caveat applies both to cases of incorrect deprivation and
to cases of incorrect beneficence.  If one reason for the universality of the
rule is to prohibit certain unjustified discriminations, then we have an
equality reason to correct either the deprivation or the beneficence.  (Under
the facially noncomparative principle that all adults are allowed to vote, an
equality objection could be asserted not only if some are denied the right to
vote, but also if others are allowed to vote twice.)
b. An egalitarian metaprinciple applies when fully
implementing the rule is impossible or undesirable
The second caveat is this.  Sometimes it might be necessary, or
desirable, not to implement a noncomparative rule fully.  For example, a
budgetary crisis might prevent all deserving recipients from receiving their
full entitlements.  And an egalitarian metaprinciple might then apply,
imposing upon the decisionmaker a second-order duty to be impartial or
                                           
163Westen, in an otherwise useful analysis of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, fails to identify the invisible equality component within a noncomparative
rule and thus misstates the significance of that rule.  Westen, Speaking of Equality,
supra note 3=, at 136-141.  Westen points out that the Amendment provides both a
federal and a state right to vote to those who are eighteen years or older whenever older
citizens have such a right.  However, because the federal Constitution elsewhere
establishes when older citizens have such a right, the effect of the Amendment is to give
eighteen year olds a noncomparative federal right to vote for certain federal officials.
But with respect to state elections, Westen asserts, the effect of the Amendment is very
different.  Since the U.S. Constitution does not create any significant requirements with
respect to the state offices that must be elective, the Amendment only creates a
contingent right: If a state allows persons older than eighteen to vote in an election, it
shall also allow eighteen year olds to do so.
All of this is true enough.  But Westen then proceeds to analyze the federal
right of eighteen year olds to vote as if it had nothing to do with nondiscrimination.
(See id. at 140.)  Yet that right, albeit noncomparative, has the scope that it does
precisely because a comparative nondiscrimination right (contained in the Amendment)
was combined with other constitutional voting rights.  If the Constitution were amended
to provide that members of the U.S. Senate were no longer to be elected, or that
Supreme Court Justices were to be elected, then the Amendment would again be
triggered and would affect the scope of the ultimate federal right to vote.  (In just the
same way, of course, if the scope of the state right to vote changes, so does the scope of
the Amendment with respect to state voting rights.)
Consider also Raz’s discussion of Dworkin’s fundamental right of equal
concern and respect.  Raz, supra note 22=, at 220.  Raz interprets Dworkin too narrowly
as endorsing only a noncomparative right, when in fact, Dworkin means at least to
emphasize the impermissibility of discrimination along this dimension.  See Simons,
supra note 48=, at 480 n. 229.
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nondiscriminatory in her decision whether to honor first-order
entitlements.164  We might, for example, give the benefits administrator
considerable discretion in distributing limited funds, but forbid him from
considering race, gender, or other impermissible factors in that decision.
(At the same time, we might also accept the use of nonegalitarian factors as
metaprinciples in this situation--e.g., benefits might first be distributed in
full to those who have a strong claim of reliance, or who satisfy some
absolute standard of need.)165
In this situation, it is sometimes difficult to decide whether the
decisionmaker’s response is egalitarian.  Suppose, for example, that the
total pool of available funds is unexpectedly 40% less than originally
promised.  And suppose the decisionmaker therefore distributes to each
recipient an allotment that is reduced 40% from the allotment which the
recipient originally deserved.  Does this distributional decision express a
right to equal treatment?  Perhaps it does, if the formula was chosen in
order to exclude certain forms of preference or inequality.  Perhaps it does
not, if the point is simply to give each individual a fair allotment, measured
by what is feasible.166
                                           
164Could the notion of “impartiality” be understood in noncomparative terms?  I think
not.  “To act ‘impartially,’” Westen suggests, “is to act without favoring one person vis-
a-vis others.”  Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, at 224 (emphasis original).
Surprisingly, in view of this plausible (and comparative) definition, Westen nevertheless
disagrees with my view that impartiality is a necessarily comparative principle.  He
gives the example of a piano teacher contracting separately with two students to give
each sixty instructional minutes a week, but skimping on the time of one of the students.
Id. at 225.  Westen correctly notes that the contractual right of each student is
noncomparative, and concludes: “Yet we would commonly say ... that by denying one
student (and not the others) the sixty-minute lesson to which he is noncomparatively
entitled, the teacher is not treating the two students ‘impartially.’”
True enough.  But the reason we would say this is precisely because the teacher
seems to be favoring one student over the other.  This conduct violates a higher-level
egalitarian principle, that (roughly speaking) one should not differentially honor (first
level, noncomparative) entitlements (without good reason, or in circumstances
suggesting favoritism).
165Westen’s discussion of unequal implementation of entitlements, in his category of
“prescriptions as baselines within descriptive standards of comparison,” neglects to
consider the possibility of egalitarian metaprinciples for judging such inequalities.  See
Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, at 86-92.
166Peters offers an argument to explain how nonegalitarian principles justify
proportional reduction in this type of case.  If the original rule says that A and B are
each independently entitled to a particular benefit, and if scarcity occurs, then
proportional reduction is required, not because of equality, but because the original rule
meant that there was no relevant difference between A and B with respect to obtaining
the benefit.  Peters, supra note 1=, at 1235.  This is a clever but unpersuasive argument.
The original entitlement rule might have meant no more or less than it said: A and B
are each entitled to the full benefit.  If the benefit cannot be fully distributed, other
principles might come into play.  For a helpful discussion of the possible choices (in the
context of Peters’ example of a drug in short supply), see Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at
1276-1278.
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Recall Peters’ shipwreck example.  Each of the eleven survivors has
a noncomparative right to a space on a lifeboat to save his life.  But it is
impossible to satisfy all entitlements; the lifeboat has space for only ten.
Moreover, unlike the limited funds example, the benefit here is indivisible;
it cannot be proportionately reduced and then distributed to all claimants.
One response to this crisis is to effectuate a comparative nonequality right,
requiring that children, or the elderly, or the marquee baseball player, be
saved first.  Another response is to effectuate an equality right: all persons
are equally entitled to live, and a lottery or similar method should be
employed to recognize their equality ex ante.167  (Notice that a
noncomparative right is less likely to operate here, in the context of a
competitive good, since the treatment that one person receives necessarily
affects the treatment that others receive.168)
The fact that a lottery results in not saving one person does not
mean that a lottery approach is based on nonegalitarian principles.  Peters
seems to think otherwise.  Since all eleven have an equal right to a place in
the lifeboat, he argues, equality demands either the impossible (saving all)
or the unthinkable (letting all eleven drown).  That is, since we must, by
hypothesis, let at least one drown, and since the other ten are similarly
situated, equality demands that we let them drown, too.  Only
nonegalitarian principles, Peters concludes, can explain the decision to save
some but not all.169
But the “nonegalitarian” principles that Peters invokes to justify
saving some but not all turn out to be comparative: each sailor should have
                                           
167Raz discusses this issue under the heading “Principles of equal distribution in
conflict.”  He discusses the principle:
(5.1) If there are n F’s each is entitled to 1/n of all the G.
and suggests that a genuinely egalitarian principle underlies (5.1), namely:
(5.2) In scarcity each who has equal entitlement is entitled to an equal share.
Raz, supra note 22=, at 222-223.
Raz is correct that the comparative equality principle (5.2) could explain (5.1).
But a noncomparative principle (call it (5.3)) could also explain (5.1):
(5.3) Every F is entitled to as much G as possible.
Then, when scarcity occurs, we would violate (5.3) if we gave a larger share of G to
some F’s than to other F’s.
168This is not necessarily the case, however.  Even with a competitive or scarce good,
noncomparative rights can operate.  A supermarket advertising “free beach balls while
quantities last” grants a (defeasible) noncomparative right to each customer to a free
beach ball.  When quantities run out, that defeasible condition kicks in.  Although the
actions of other customers affect the condition, this fact does not render the right
comparative in any important sense.
The boundary between comparative and noncomparative rights is sometimes
difficult to draw.  I do not have the space to explore the issue further here.
169Peters, supra note 1=, at 1237-1238.
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an equal (10/11) chance for a place in the lifeboat.  And just as the
impossibility of satisfying all noncomparative entitlements to a place need
not drive us towards satisfying none of these entitlements, as Peters
concedes,170 the impossibility of satisfying each sailor’s comparative
entitlement to a place (if any other sailor gets one) need not drive us
towards satisfying none of these comparative entitlements.  In both
instances, although providing places to all eleven sailors may be the ideal
solution (albeit for different reasons), providing equal ex ante opportunities
might be second best.
The lifeboat example underscores an important point: To
understand equality principles, we must understand their domain.171
Equality can pertain to results, but it can also pertain to opportunities.  It
can address the tangible treatments created by law (e.g., whether men and
women are equal in their entitlement or disentitlement to parental leave),
but it can also address the law’s effect on a group’s status (e.g., whether
“equal” denial of parental leave reinforces the subordination of women).172
When the subject matter is an indivisible benefit, such as the allocation of
scarce medical care or life-saving opportunities or the allocation of a single
managerial job position, equality of opportunity is likely to be a more
important principle than equality of outcome.173
This second caveat applies not only to incorrect deprivations, but
also to incorrect beneficence.  It might be quite predictable, for example,
that a government benefits program will occasionally make overpayments.
Egalitarian principles can govern the systematic response to such errors.
Thus, if accounting system A is likely to result in errors favoring the
wealthy, while accounting system B is likely to result in errors distributed
more evenly across income classes, one might choose accounting system B,
                                           
170Id. at 1240.
171See Rae, supra note 62=.
172See Section B.4= supra.
173An interesting analytical problem arises here.  Are equality principles with respect to
indivisible benefits subject to the leveling down and multiplication of wrong objections?
It might seem not.  If the “benefit” is a place on the lifeboat, then one can level up (as
many as possible get a seat) or down (no one does).  But if the “benefit” is defined as an
equal chance for a place, how could one level up or down?  Everyone deserves a 10/11
chance, in Peters’ example.  Or consider a more common example: discrimination in
filling the only supervisor position in a job category.  If the person hired is no more
qualified than the person passed over, it is infeasible to level up, yet it seems absurd to
level down.  The appropriate analysis is to require an equal opportunity for the job: each
candidate deserves equal consideration, apart from race or other impermissible traits.
But how can “equal consideration” be a matter of leveling up or down?
The answer is that the decisionmaker might have discretion concerning the
nature of the benefit that is offered, discretion that permits “leveling up” or “leveling
down” in the relevant sense.  In the lifeboat example, the captain might be in position to
save either a rickety 10-person boat or a more sturdy 8-person boat; the survivors have a
right to an equal chance at the available seats on whatever boat is saved.  In the
employment example, the employer has discretion to advertise more or less widely, even
though this affects the prospects of the two candidates before her.  (Or she may redefine
the nature or emoluments of the job.)
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without, of course, compromising on the effort to develop a more accurate
system for preventing errors.
c. An equality principle requires the decisionmaker to
explain why he departed from the rule in some but
not all cases
The general point that unequal implementation of a rule presents no
distinctive equality problem is subject to a third caveat: this inequality, like
any inequality in treatment, might demand explanation.  A demand for
reasons for inequality is one important type of equality right, as noted
above.  Thus if, under (3A), both children finish dinner but only one
receives dessert, the disappointed child might reasonably ask for a
justification.  She might complain not only that I have violated her
noncomparative rights under (3A), but also that I have treated her
differently from her brother for no apparent reason.  Or, in a slightly
different vein, she might complain that whatever reason I might have for
dishonoring her entitlement applies equally to him.  With respect to this
demand-for-reasons equality right, violating both of their noncomparative
rights is “better,” for there would no longer be a differential distribution of
dessert to explain.
Of course, all things considered, the equality right might be weak
and not dispositive.  I might have a stronger reason for denying Bonnie her
entitlement than for denying Clyde his, even though I might concede that I
have breached her entitlement.  (She complained that dinner was “yucky.”)
Or I might reformulate rule (3A) on the spot, concluding that I will no
longer honor this entitlement if one of my children has misbehaved, or if
bedtime has passed.  I might even believe that the children should not get
too attached to dessert, and that it is a good thing if occasionally I depart
from the rule for no reason at all.  (Or I might wish to prepare them for the
whims of the administrators they will encounter in their adult life.)  Still, a
demand-for-reasons equality claim can exert some force in the direction of
requiring an explanation and requiring consistent application of a reason to
all of my children.
This demand for a justification of inequality can be invoked in
instances of incorrect beneficence, as well as incorrect deprivation.  Recall
Peters’ lottery example ((3B), above).  Unlucky might well ask why Lucky
obtained the windfall.  Was it because she is friendly with the lottery
commissioner?  (And is that an impermissible consideration in a
government distributional decision?)  Or, worse, was it because she was
white and he is black?  If so, he is entitled to challenge the decision on
egalitarian as well as noncomparative grounds.174  If, however, the windfall
is due to an innocent error, Unlucky might have no valid equality claim.175
                                           
174Indeed, he might have standing to raise the equality claim, but he is unlikely to have
standing to raise the noncomparative right claim, considered by itself.175Peters
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But an objection looms.  Perhaps the duty to be consistent in one’s
reasons for treatment is not an egalitarian duty at all.  Requiring
consistency of reasons for departing from a rule seems similar to requiring
consistent treatment under a rule; and the latter, we have seen, is often not
a genuine equality principle.176  “Consistency” in either context, one might
say, simply means following a reason or rule to the natural extent of its
“authority.”  One should never be irrational, whether one is treating one
person or many, and whether one is irrationally treating people the same or
irrationally treating them differently.
The objection is misplaced.  In a demand-for-reasons equality claim,
the complaint is premised on differential treatment.  Consistency of reasons
might be required as a justification of that differential.  For example, in a
rational basis equal protection case, the plaintiff asserts that he is a member
of a class that is similarly situated to another class of persons who receive
better treatment, and that government needs a reason for the differential.177
The government cannot successfully defend its policy by adducing a reason
that concededly would entitle both classes to the benefit.  In familiar equal
protection jargon, such a reason is underinclusive.178
To be sure, one might also hold the view that a decisionmaker
should never act irrationally, in any context, whether comparative or
noncomparative.  As a logical matter, if all inequalities demand
justification, why shouldn’t all equalities demand justification?  That is,
why shouldn’t a person be entitled to make a different sort of comparative
claim–that he was unfairly lumped together with others, and that the
decisionmaker should explain why?  (In constitutional jargon, this is a
complaint of overbreadth.)179  Moreover, why shouldn’t a person be
entitled to demand a reason for any noncomparative treatment?
The short answer is that we might or might not extend the demand
for reasons to all of these contexts.  If we do extend the demand, however,
the type and weight of reasons demanded should be sensitive to distinctions
                                                                                                                                 
implicitly argues only for the leveling up form of “prescriptive equality”:  Unlucky
wants to get what Lucky got, not to have Lucky leveled down.  But a pure equality right
is satisfied by either remedy, and the force of the noncomparative right here might result
in the leveling down remedy, if Lucky has already disposed of the windfall proceeds.
176See, e.g., Raz, supra note 22=, at 229 (arguing that equality is used contextually and
argumentatively, but not normatively, when we make the “ad hominem” claim: “‘You
seem to acknowledge the force of the reason in one case so why do you deny it in the
other?’”).
177See Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 447, = (1989).
178See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)(zoning
that excludes a group home for the retarded cannot be justified by supposed interests in
avoiding flood dangers, avoiding legal responsibility, preventing overcrowding and the
like, because these interests can’t explain the beneficial treatment given to other
permitted uses).
179See Simons, supra note 175, at =.  It is also one sense of the claim that “unequals
should be treated unequally” and that “unalikes should be treated unalike.”  See Simons,
supra note 48=, at 437-442.
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in context (as constitutional doctrine amply illustrates).180  Egalitarians can
coherently endorse the view that inequalities in particular demand
justification of a certain type and weight.
The upshot of these three caveats is that sometimes, for these three
different reasons, the unequal distribution of entitlements under a
noncomparative rule does raise a genuine equality problem.181  But should
we go further, and treat these caveats as swallowing the rule?  A legal or
moral system might go so far as to recognize the following perfectly
general “egalitarian rule-correction” principle:
(2C)  If a particular noncomparative rule (3) provides that all T’s
shall receive B, and if any person within T obtains B, then all
persons within T should obtain B.
But this principle, while intelligible, is not very plausible.  For there
are many circumstances in which a decisionmaker cannot or should not
confer all entitlements, as we have seen.  On the other hand, if this principle
is interpreted only as a principle possessing minimal weight relative to other
principles, e.g., as simply demanding a weak justification, then it is more
plausible.
2. As a critique of existing rules
Equality principles often operate as critiques of existing moral or
legal rules.
The earlier sections discussing the unequal implementation of rules
did not address challenges to the rule itself as inconsistent with equality
principles.  Indeed, the very idea of lexical equality is that equality is just a
question of unequal implementation of a rule or principle.  But of course
challenges to the content of moral or  legal rules (such as legislative rules)
are among the most prevalent types of equality arguments.  To be sure,
challenges to the unequal administration of rules, or to discretion exercised
under a rule, can raise serious equality problems.  But equality is often
invoked to challenge legislative rules that classify according to race,
gender, mental disability, state of origin, sexual preference, and the like.
And egalitarian challenges can be broader and deeper still, questioning
basic social policies that result in social stratification and extremes of
wealth and poverty, or that fail to alleviate such inequalities.
                                           
180See Greenawalt, supra note 2=, 83 Col. L. Rev. at 1177 (“For [a] rule to survive [an
equal protection rational basis challenge], the state needs not only a legitimate reason
for treating the claimants the way it does–that reason would suffice to meet a
straightforward substantive due process attack; the state must also have a legitimate
reason for drawing the lines of inclusion and exclusion as it does.”); Simons, supra note
175=, at =.  =some examples?
181Even when these caveats apply, however, they will often require, not full
implementation of a rule, but only selective implementation.
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The “demand for reasons” type of equality right is often asserted in
challenges to the fairness of legislation.  Equal protection doctrine
examines “classificatory fit,” i.e., a law’s relationship to its purpose.  If the
purpose logically justifies burdening a broader class than the classification
purports to burden, then the law is underinclusive.  If the purpose justifies
burdening a narrower class, the law is overinclusive or overbroad.
Through these doctrinal requirements, equal protection law attempts to
give substance to the ambiguous demand that “likes be treated alike.”182
3. In both discretionary and nondiscretionary decisions
Equality principles apply to both discretionary and nondiscretionary
decisions.  At first blush, they seem more problematic in the latter context,
for nondiscretionary decisions trigger a troubling objection–the objection
that insisting on equality means insisting on the multiplication of wrongs.
Yet there is a cognate objection in the discretionary context–the objection
that equality means leveling down.  In this part of the article, I explore the
discretionary/ nondiscretionary distinction and the strength of these
objections.
The problem of unequal distribution under a rule is ordinarily raised
in the context of absolute or nondiscretionary entitlements, a context in
which a demand for equality seems especially troublesome, because the
“multiplication of wrongs” objection to equality seems especially plausible.
In example (3A), if the parent wrongly denies one child his dessert, he only
multiplies the wrong by denying dessert to the other child.183  More
generally, for noncomparative rules such as (3), all T’s are absolutely
entitled to B.  Then it is a clear wrong not to provide B to any person with
trait T.  But if it is wrong to deny B to one person with trait T, it is surely
wrong to deny B to even more persons with trait T.  And then it hardly
seems justifiable to respond to unequal distribution of B among persons
with T with equal denial of B to all persons with T.
At first glance, it appears that equality principles are more plausible
when the benefit at issue is discretionary, rather than an absolute
entitlement, because we can then avoid the multiplication of wrongs
objection.  By characterizing a benefit (or relief from a burden) as
                                           
182However, we can distinguish egalitarian from nonegalitarian concerns about
classificatory fit.  For example, the egalitarian concern is whether the asserted argument
for differential treatment proves too little or too much; the nonegalitarian concern might
be whether the asserted purpose is a fraud, or is insufficiently furthered to justify
infringement of the plaintiff’s rights or interests.  See Simons, Overinclusion and
Underinclusion, supra note 175=, at =.
183Compare Peters’ lottery example, (3B), which involves incorrect beneficence rather
than incorrect deprivation.  Here, “multiplication of the wrong” would mean a
multiplication of incorrect beneficence, i.e., giving Unlucky a windfall because Lucky
received one.  (On whether this should count as a “wrong” or “injustice,” see note 111=
infra.)
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“discretionary,” I mean that at the time of treatment, the decisionmaker has
the option either to confer B or not to confer B without violating the
recipients’ rights or otherwise wronging the recipients.184  Of course,
discretion often exists within a range.  The decisionmaker has discretion if,
so long as he acts within that range, he does no wrong.185  (A judge might
have discretion to sentence a burglar to a prison term ranging from three
year to ten years, meaning that a sentence within that range violates neither
the burglar’s rights nor the judge’s duties.)  Insofar as the decisionmaker
has discretion whether to confer B, then the “multiplication of wrongs”
objection is misplaced, for the simple reason that the original denial of
desired treatment is not a wrong in the first place.186
Consider this example.  A university official is greeting alumni at a
university function.  He might simply voice a friendly greeting to each
person, or he might also shake everyone’s hand.  Suppose we conclude that
either practice is consistent with his duty to show respect to his guests.  To
                                           
184For helpful discussions of discretion, see Dworkin, supra note 89=, at 31-35, 68-71
(1977); Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules 222-228 (1991).
Recall that a benefit is optional if it could initially have been denied; but it
becomes vested if, once conferred, it cannot be freely withdrawn.  text at notes = infra.
Optional benefits might or might not be vested.  And vested benefits can be strongly or
weakly vested.  The strength of the entitlement can be measured by its temporal duration
(e.g., benefits cannot be retroactively withdrawn, or, more strongly, must be distributed
prospectively for some period of time) or by its ability to override other moral or legal
considerations.
All legal entitlements might be considered “optional” in the sense that the
political system might ultimately change the entitlement (even such entitlements as
constitutional rights).  But, for purposes of equality analysis, the question is more
limited: does the decisionmaker (a judge, or administrator, or legislator, or parent) have
the option, at the time of the decision, to redefine or alter the recipient’s entitlement?  If
not, then the entitlement is mandatory in the relevant sense, even though the entitlement
can be altered by some other authority (or by that decisionmaker at some other time).
185Discretion might also, or instead, be limited by the requirement that the
decisionmaker act only for certain reasons.  For example, a sentencing judge might be
permitted to act only on the basis of retribution, deterrence, cooperation with the police,
and other identified factors.  But the decision remains discretionary if the judge is
permitted to weigh and balance these factors as she likes.
186See Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, supra note 36=, at 11-12 (asserting that
intertemporal equality has little weight except in two situations: where the good in
question is a discretionary benefit and where it is competitive, such that inequality
amounts to deprivation).
More precisely, the multiplication of wrongs objection is misplaced insofar as
the decisionmaker has discretion to confer B within range R (e.g. a sentence from one to
ten years).   Suppose one judge has sentenced X to one year and Y to five years.    If the
judge could have imposed any sentence beween one and ten years without committing a
wrong, a later judge can remedy the unequal distribution of B within R either by
leveling up within R (sentencing both to one year) or by leveling down (sentencing both
to five years).  The leveling down option depends, of course, on whether X’s entitlement
to a one year sentence vests once it is announced.
Peters pays virtually no attention to discretionary decisions.  It is therefore not
surprising that he emphasizes so heavily the multiplication of wrongs objection to
equality.
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that extent, his duty is discretionary.  However, if he were to shake the
hands of whites but not blacks, he would violate a duty not to discriminate
on racial grounds.  Now suppose the official realizes that he has unjustly
discriminated against blacks, and responds by voicing a greeting to all
guests and discontinuing the practice of shaking hands.  Is he now
“multiplying the wrong”?  No, because the decision to voice a greeting but
not shake hands is not a wrong in the first place.
Consider another example, from the employment context.
Compare two scenarios:
(2D) (Discretionary decision):
An employer has substantial discretion over standards for
promotion to a job category with higher pay.  The employer, in his
discretion, weighs length of service, current quality of work, and
ability to work with other employees.  He promotes Mark but not
Wilma.
If it is discovered that the employer’s reason for not promoting Wilma was
actually a stereotyped assumption that women are unable to handle
management roles, then he violates her equality right.  Does this mean that
he must promote her?  Not necessarily–at least, not by virtue of equality
principles alone.187  Counterfactually, he could have initially adopted a
more stringent standard under which neither Mark nor Wilma was
promoted, without wronging them.  Thus, if he now adopts that more
stringent standard, revoking Mark’s promotion, he does not “multiply a
wrong.”188
The fact that discretionary benefits cannot trigger the
“multiplication of the wrong” objection does not necessarily provide great
solace to egalitarians, however.  For discretionary benefits do prompt the
“leveling down” objection.  As we have just seen, the employer could
remedy the inequality after the fact, or could avoid it in the first instance,
by exercising discretion in either a stingy or a generous direction.
The “multiplication of the wrong” and “leveling down” objections
are closely related.  Each reflects a distinctive feature of equality rights–
their flexibility.  In the case of a nondiscretionary entitlement, equal
                                           
187Federal antidiscrimination laws support “make whole” relief, generally interpreted as
requiring promotion in this situation, where feasible.  Thus, Title VII does
presumptively entitle the victim of discrimination to back pay and retroactive promotion
or reinstatement.  Charles R. Rickey, Manual on Employment Discrimination Law and
Civil Actions in the Federal Courts 1-85 (2d ed. 1996), citing Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975).  See §706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g).
=other laws=.
However, neither reinstatement of a fired employee nor promotion of an
employee who was illegally passed over is required if a reduction in force or legitimate
reorganization eliminated the position.   See Mack Player, Employment Discrimination
Law 554 (stu. ed. 1988)(Age Discrimination in Employment Act); =.
188Once an optional benefit becomes vested, however, revoking it is indeed wrongful.
See text at notes 84-85= infra; note 184= infra.
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treatment requires either equal conferral of the entitlement or equal denial;
and equal denial amounts to multiplying the wrong.  In the case of a
discretionary benefit, equal treatment requires either equal conferral of the
benefit or equal denial; and equal denial amounts to leveling down (though
it does not constitute multiplying the wrong).189
Now imagine a second scenario, in which employees have an
absolute entitlement to promotion based on certain objective criteria:
(2E) (Nondiscretionary decision):
Any employee with five years experience and no negative written
evaluations will be promoted.  Both Mark and Wilma are entitled to
promotion under the relevant criteria.  Again, the employer
promotes Mark but not Wilma.
Suppose that in this case, as in the prior example, the actual reason for the
employer’s not promoting Wilma is his bias against women.  But now, the
employer has committed two wrongs; he has denied Wilma a promotion
she deserves (a noncomparative wrong); and he has treated her worse than
he would have treated her had she been male (a comparative wrong).  And
now, the “multiplication of wrongs” objection seems, at first glance, more
plausible.  Is it not absurd that equality would be satisfied by denying
promotion to both individuals, in violation of both of their noncomparative
absolute entitlements?
This result, I submit, is not absurd but perfectly defensible.  Of
course it is better if the employer satisfies both entitlements rather than
neither.  Equality is not the only principle that matters.  But it does matter.
“Multiplying the wrong” by denying promotion to both Mark and Wilma is
better in a very important respect than promoting Mark but not Wilma: it
avoids insulting and stigmatizing Wilma.  And one can certainly justify a
distinct remedy for the equality violation, over and above the remedy for
denial of the entitlement.190
I have been discussing nondiscrimination rights, a type of
“negative” equality rights.  But positive equality rights, as well as negative,
can apply to the distribution of both discretionary and nondiscretionary
benefits.  For example, suppose a state law requires equal educational
spending across school districts (or forbids inequalities of greater than a
certain scope).  Suppose further that the law does not guarantee a
                                           
189The close relationship of the two objections also makes it unnecessary to clarify the
sense of “wrong” that is multiplied.  The most plausible meaning, because it is the
meaning that justifies the rhetorical bite of the objection, is the denial of a person’s
rights or entitlements, to his detriment.  But Peters also counts as a “wrong” any
incorrect treatment, even one to the benefit of the recipient.  See note = supra.
Alexander, similarly, seems to adopt a broad notion of “wrong”: he complains that
equality does not plausibly support a doctrine of precedent because we would then be
committed to replicating “morally erroneous decisions.”  Text at note 37= supra.
190=check Title VII on this.=  For further discussion, see Section C.4= supra (“Only a
prohibition on using irrelevant criteria”).
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noncomparative minimum spending level for education.  Then the state has
provided a positive equality right that governs distribution of a
discretionary benefit; if a wealthy district spends X on each student, then
the state must equalize funding so that a poor district spends X, too; or it
must employ some other formula that results in equal spending.191  Here,
even if applying the equality principle results in wealthy districts spending
less on their children’s education than if no equality principle applied, this is
not an instance of the “multiplication of a wrong,” because by hypothesis
children have no right to a particular level of educational funding.
Now suppose that the state legislature does guarantee a
noncomparative minimum spending level of Y per student in every district
in the state.  However, insufficient funding is available.  (As before, a state
law requires equalization.)  If it is feasible to equalize existing state and
local resources at the level of W per student, should a court require this,
even if W is less than Y?  Yes, insofar as the court wishes to honor the
equality right.  Notice that this solution does “multiply the wrong” if, but
for equalization, some districts would be able to satisfy level Y.
Nevertheless, this egalitarian solution might be warranted, depending on
the relative strength of the equality right and the noncomparative right.
In the end, the question whether wrongs should be multiplied, or
benefits leveled down, depends on context and on the scope and force of
the relevant equality right.  Of course, if the right is impure, that represents
a conclusion (flowing from the relevant factors) that leveling up is
required.192  In the case of strong nondiscrimination rights, such as the
right not to suffer invidious racial discrimination, multiplying the wrong or
leveling down is indeed defensible, if that is the only feasible option.
Indeed, in some cases, it might even be better to level down (or multiply
the wrong) than to level up (or eliminate the wrong).193  But as to weaker
equality rights, multiplying the wrong will more often be unjustifiable.
Consider a “demand-for-reasons” equality right, requiring only that the
decisionmaker have a rational reason for differential treatment.  If this right
has little weight, it would be permissible for a government to give a small
economic benefit to some businesses but not other businesses which seem
to be about as deserving, merely for reasons of administrative convenience
                                           
191More realistically, courts interpreting a constitutional or legislative equalization
requirement are likely to permit the state to adopt a formula that minimizes inequalities,
restricting them to a certain range. =cites=
192See Section B.3= for discussion of the “pure/impure” distinction.
193See Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy 246-248 (1995),
pointing out that leveling down can be the preferable way to eliminate the inequality
when inequality takes the form of unequal satisfaction of nonbasic needs.  Achieving a
higher level of satisfaction of such relative needs is essentially a status good, and it is
better to eliminate such status by leveling down than by leveling up.  (Consider housing:
beyond assuring a decent minimum, government might choose to restrict the affluent
from building more expensive housing rather than promote more expensive housing for
the poor.  Id. at 252-254.)
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(so long as the criterion of unequal distribution doesn’t violate a stronger
equality right, such as a prohibition on racial discrimination).194
A final point about discretionary decisions is this.  Even when a
decision is discretionary, the demand-for-reasons type of equality right
could militate in favor of consistent treatment.  I emphasize “could”: in
some contexts, the very point of permitting discretion is to immunize the
decisionmaker from any inquiry or concern about her reasons for
treatment.
On the one hand, consider two cases in which it is plausible to
require equal treatment absent a good reason for differential treatment.
First, suppose that a daffy uncle, without explanation, gives his young
nephew a gift of $10,000, and his young niece a gift of only $5.  A parent
might wish to intervene to correct this irrational inequality and to equalize
the gifts, “leveling down” the bank account of the nephew in order to level
the niece up.  Indeed, if the gifts are in kind rather than in cash, the parent
might prefer to waste the more expensive gift rather than allow the
inequality.195
A second case comes from the sentencing context.  A judge
sentences two defendants, J and K, who jointly participated in a crime and
whose participation was identical.196  Suppose the judge has discretion
within a statutory range, and suppose she may consider any one of a
number of purposes of punishment, including retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, prospect of rehabilitation, cooperation with the police, and
the like.  She is permitted to balance these factors as she wishes, and
indeed to interpret their meaning as she wishes.197  Now suppose (perhaps
heroically198) that the judge is confident that the two defendants are
                                           
194See, e.g. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993); New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
195Greenawalt gives a similar example where waste would not be objectionable.  See
Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at 1277 (parent refuses to buy last remaining toy of a certain
type in order to avoid treating children unequally).
196See Greenawalt, id. at 1267, 1271; Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, at
195-199, 211-219.
197See Coons, supra note 110=.
198Or perhaps not.  As Greenawalt points out, “sometimes we are confident that two
people count as relatively equal–for example, that they should be punished equally–
before we have decided what treatment they should receive.”  Greenawalt, supra note
1=, at 1267 (footnote omitted).
Westen offers an interesting response to this argument and the argument in the
text.  He claims that the sentencing judge implicitly is employing a rule to decide the
treatment of each defendant, and it is that rule, not the concept of equality, that prompts
the judge to treat them equally.  The rule is to the effect that no criminal sentence shall
exceed or fall short of the sentence that most closely corresponds in gravity to the
defendant’s blameworthiness, or that would most effectively deter, and so forth.
Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, at 195-199.  See also id. at 212-213.
The problem with this response is familiar: the response asserts a
noncomparative right, and thus ignores the comparative character of the original
argument.  Thus, suppose that the judge wishes to dispense a punishment corresponding
to blame, and he knows what J and K have done, but he does not know what punishment
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identical with respect to all of these factors.  Is it justifiable for her to treat
them differently?
It is possible, of course, that one of the acceptable purposes of
punishment itself argues for differential treatment even though the
participation of J and K is otherwise equal.  For example, some
consequentialists would support arbitrarily sentencing similarly situated
defendants differently, on the theory that sentencing A to nine years and B
and C to five secures as much deterrence as sentencing all three to seven
years does (and at lesser cost to the individuals and to the state).199  But
assume that the judge does not believe this.  Must she be consistent in her
treatment of J and K?
Perhaps she must.  K has an understandable objection if J is treated
more leniently for no apparent reason.  Although the judge is free to weigh
and balance the factors as she wishes, or even to choose the factors she
considers relevant and irrelevant, perhaps she must be consistent, applying
the same weight in all cases before her.  It is justifiable to demand a
reasoned explanation for unequal treatment even when the original
treatment could have been different.
Now this equality right might be weak.  For example, suppose the
judge sentenced J a year ago, while K comes before the judge today.  If the
judge believes she erred in sentencing J as she did, then the judge has some
reason to treat K differently.  Securing the correct result, and encouraging
reflective development of law and policy, are certainly reasons militating in
favor of a different resolution in the case of K.  By contrast, when a judge
simultaneously sentences J and K, these reasons are unlikely to be served.
On the other hand, sometimes the value of discretion is very great,
even when the decisions are essentially simultaneous.  Indeed, sometimes it
is important that an actor not be required to account for his reasons at all.
If so, even impermissible reasons cannot be prohibited.  This argument
supports the traditional view that lawyers have complete and unreviewable
                                                                                                                                 
they deserve.  He might feel that a punishment ranging from, say, 5 to 10 years in prison
would be within the range of deserved punishment.  But he might also know that the two
defendants are equal in blame, and therefore conclude that it would be wrong to treat
them differently.  It would be especially troubling if the judge were to treat the two
differently, even if neither the judge nor outside observers were confident in answering
the noncomparative question of how much punishment each defendant deserves (without
regard to the punishment that the other deserves).
Westen is indeed correct that the sentencing decision embodies an implicit rule
or set of rules, and that the rules themselves might permit discretion in setting the
appropriate punishment.  But it is critical that a comparative background rule is in effect
(providing, roughly, that a judge exercising discretion in sentencing must treat equally
those defendants who are identical with respect to the relevant purposes of punishment).
If instead only the noncomparative rule “provide a sentence based on blame within the
bounds of your discretion” were in effect, the judge could give J 5 years and K 10 years.
The propriety of the first sentence would have no bearing whatsoever on the propriety of
the second.
199See also Westen, Speaking of Equality, supra note 3=, at 197-198.
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discretion in exercising peremptory challenges.200  A less deferential view
finds impermissible certain reasons for peremptory challenges, such as
racial and sexual stereotypes.  This is essentially the current state of the
law.201  On this view, even if a lawyer chooses to weigh various permissible
factors (such as occupation and income) in a particular way in deciding to
challenge prospective juror X (for example, rejecting X because he is an
affluent computer programmer), the lawyer may weigh those factors in a
different way and decide not to challenge prospective juror Y, even if Y is
similarly situated to X with respect to all of the factors.202
4. With varying force
The force that an equality principle exerts depends on the specific
egalitarian norm at issue.  To say that an equality principle applies is not to
say that it carries the day.  Other moral reasons might, all things
considered, demand a result different from what equality demands, or
might at least tip the scales in favor of one egalitarian outcome over
another (thereby favoring leveling up over leveling down, or vice versa).
Thus, one obviously needs a compelling justification for infringing a right
not to suffer racial discrimination, if indeed this can be justified at all, while
one needs little if any justification for not providing Mr. Unlucky (in
Peters’ example) with a benefit equal to the windfall received by Ms.
Lucky.
                                           
200However, the rationale for this view is probably not that racist motivation is actually
acceptable, but instead that the cost of inquiring into its existence would be too great,
limiting the parties’ discretion in other undesirable ways.
201=cites
202Selective prosecution is another context in which courts defer to prosecutors’ need for
flexibility and discretion.  Chief Judge Richard Posner recently summarized the doctrine
as follows:
[“Selective prosecution”] has two meanings in law.  The first is simply failing
to prosecute all known lawbreakers, whether because of ineptitude or (more
commonly) because of lack of adequate resources.  The resulting pattern of
nonenforcement may be random, or an effort may be made to get the most bang
for the prosecutorial buck by concentrating on the most newsworthy
lawbreaker, but in either case the result is that people who are equally guilty of
crimes or other violations receive unequal treatment, with some being punished
and others getting off scot-free.  That form of selective prosecution, although it
involves dramatically unequal legal treatment, has no standing in equal
protection law. ... The second form of selective prosecution, and the only one
that is actionable under the federal Constitution, is where the decision to
prosecute is made either in retaliation for the exercise of a a constitutional
right, such as the right to free speech or to the free exercise of religion, or
because of membership in a vulnerable group.
Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1955).  Judge Posner goes on, however,
to recognize another category of judicially cognizable selective prosecution–where a
citizen is singled out for official harassment because of malice and spite.
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In his response to Peters’ article, Kent Greenawalt makes some of
these points quite powerfully.  He emphasizes that equality, like other
moral norms, can either reinforce or pull against the balance of other
reasons, sometimes making a difference, sometimes not.203  When
egalitarian principles pull against nonegalitarian ones, the former do not
(contrary to Peters’ view) necessarily become contradictory or
incoherent.204  Of course, equal protection doctrine recognizes this
variation in force by establishing varying degrees of judicial scrutiny
depending on the invidiousness of the classifying trait and the importance
of the personal interest that is differentially burdened.205
The force and role of egalitarian reasons also depend on whether
equality is understood to be a teleological principle (achieving equality
should be the actor’s goal) or a deontological principle (the actor’s duty is
to respect equality; the duty constrains pursuit of other goals).206  In either
case, when a genuine right to equal treatment is at stake, equality is itself a
goal or duty, and not simply a consequence of other analysis, in normative
argument.  But there are many ways in which achieving equality (or
avoiding inequality) can be a goal, or respecting equality can be a duty.
Thus, equality could be an ultimate or foundational goal, duty, or
right.  (An example would be Ronald Dworkin’s assertion that a
fundamental right to equal concern and respect underlies all other
important political rights.207)  Within a teleological or consequentialist
account, equality could be an instrumental goal, serving such purposes as
avoiding envy and civil strife, and encouraging citizens to develop self-
respect.  But teleological equality could also be valued intrinsically, and not
simply because its aggregate consequences for human welfare are
beneficial.  This is the point of Parfit’s telling “divided world” hypothetical:
inequality between citizens on separate islands could be viewed as an
intrinsically bad state of affairs even if the citizens have no awareness of
each other (i.e., even if the inequality creates no further bad consequences,
such as envy or hostility).208
                                           
203Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at 1269-1271, 1273-1283.  Greenawalt gives the
following example.  A professor determines that 89 is the top of the B+ range.  By
mistake, when S receives an 89, the professor gives her an A-.  T also received an 89.
Greenawalt suggests that “prescriptive equality” provides a reason to give T an A- as
well, even though this contradicts the original grading scheme.  Id.  at 1271.  As
Greenawalt points out, this is a case of equality “pulling against the balance of other
reasons,” id., because the grading scheme might be partly designed to measure
achievement absolutely, or consistently over time.  This is a justifiable instance of
multiplying the original wrong, if no one else is similarly situated to S and T, and if the
harm of departing slightly from the grading scheme is not serious.
204Id. at 1281.
205=cites: discuss strict scrutiny, intermed. scrutiny, rational basis tests.
206See Dennis McKerlie, Equality, 106 Ethics 274 (1996); Temkin, supra note 38?=, at
=; Parfit, supra note 38=, at =.
207See note 89= supra.
208Parfit, supra note 38=, at =.  =further description of hypo?=
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Equality rights can have a complex argumentative structure.  In
equal protection doctrine, for example, equality principles help tell us what
types of justifications are themselves inconsistent with egalitarian norms,209
what egalitarian goals are mandatory,210 what traits are impermissible or
suspect bases for discrimination, what interests trigger higher scrutiny
when they are unequally burdened, and how much classificatory precision
(in the connection of means to end) is required.
Equality rights sometimes operate behind the scenes.  Even when
an entitlement on its face is noncomparative, it can be the result of the
combined effect of other legal or moral principles, one of which is a
comparative equality right.  As noted earlier, universality of certain
apparently noncomparative rights (such as the right to vote) might be
egalitarian in inspiration, at least in part.  And that egalitarian source might
be a visible, operative right, or instead an invisible and inoperative one.211
Finally, the force of an equality right obviously depends upon its
status within the lexical hierarchy of a legal or moral system.  In our legal
system, constitutional rules trump legislative rules, so a constitutional
equality principle trumps a legislative classification.  Thus, if a gender
classification violates the equal protection clause, the legislature must
equalize treatment of men and women, even if it desires neither to expend
the additional resources to level up, nor to incur the wrath of men by
leveling down.  On the other hand, if a gender classification is embedded in
a state constitution, and the only equality requirement is at the level of state
legislation, then it is unlikely that the classification can be challenged.  Of
course, a major reason why certain principles are embedded at higher levels
in the hierarchy is to assure that they have special force relative to other
principles.212
E. Answering the supposed problems with equality
We are now in a position to see why the supposed problems with
equality either are nonproblems or are exaggerated.  The arguments in this
section often refer back to the arguments in the main part of this article.
                                           
209“[A] bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group” won’t wash.  See Romer v.
Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620, = (1996), quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973).  See also Jeremy Waldron, The Substance of Equality, 89 Mich.
L. Rev. 1350, 1359 (1991)(book review of Westen, Speaking of Equality)(arguing that
“in advancing social justifications, we are required to accord equal concern to the
interests of everyone in society”).
210See note 234= infra.
211See Section D1.a [TAN 158-161]= supra.
212See Rawls, supra note 51=, at 199 (explaining that the lexically prior principles of
justice are best embodied at the constitutional level, while the lexically subsequent
difference principle is best implemented through legislation).
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1. Emptiness
Is equality an empty concept?  Yes and no.
Yes, equality is “empty” of content in one sense–it is a general
concept, not a concrete conception.  In order to invoke egalitarian
principles in any particular legal or moral context, one needs to develop a
persuasive substantive account explaining which discriminations are wrong,
and why;213 what distributive justice ideal is most attractive; how (and
when) a decisionmaker must justify his mistakes; and so forth.
But no, equality is not an empty concept.  Its comparative form
gives it contingency and flexibility, and distinguishes it from all
noncomparative views.
What about the formal conception of equality, “treat likes alike”?
This conception is indeed empty, insofar as it means “give any and all
persons what they are entitled to under a pertinent rule or norm.”  But it is
not empty if it expresses an egalitarian demand for a principled explanation
of differences in treatment.
2. Confusion
Far from causing confusion, equality arguments are clarifying.
The loss of the concept of equality would make it much more
difficult to explain how equal protection differs from due process, and how
invidious discrimination can differ from affirmative action.  It would make
it virtually impossible to explain the point of many important theories of
distributive justice.214
Still, it is true that descriptive and normative equality are often
confused; and that sometimes a vague sense of “equality” is defended and
approved, leaving unspecified the particular equality principle at issue.  For
example, even when it is clear that equality between men and women is, in
some sense, at issue, it might be unclear whether the operative principle is
the duty to avoid making explicit distinctions in treatment, or instead the
duty not to make decisions based on gendered stereotypes, or instead the
duty not to further subordinate the status of women.215
On the other hand, to return to one of Westen’s examples,216 it is
hardly surprising that Abraham Lincoln relied on equality and Stephen A.
Douglas did not.  The substantive equality principle that Lincoln relied
                                           
213See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987); Larry Alexander,
What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?  Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and
Proxies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149 (1992); Brest, Foreward: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, = Harv. L. Rev. =.
214See discussion of Peters’ analysis of Rawls, TAN 140-146= supra.
215See TAN 228-238= infra.
216See note 22= supra.
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upon was a genuine and very important egalitarian norm of
antidiscrimination and equal status of all persons.  The supposed equality
principles upon which (Westen insists) Douglas could have relied are not
equality principles at all, but instead noncomparative rights–the right of
states to decide about slavery, or the right of each person to receive the
benefit of existing (and obviously discriminatory) laws.
3. Gratuitousness
The claim of gratuitousness simply ignores the crucial category of
comparative rights.  Collapsing egalitarian norms into the formal principle
“treat likes alike” (as Westen often suggests) or into “nonegalitarian
justice” (as Peters suggests) deprives us of a valuable and distinctive
concept.217  For example, Peters declares that the term “equal” in the equal
protection clause is otiose.  But to eliminate this word might suggest that
the constitution guarantees some minimum level of protection to each
citizen, without regard to how others are treated.  It might, in other words,
misleadingly suggest that the clause protects noncomparative rather than
comparative rights.  Yet the distinctive force of the equal protection clause
is its “equal protection” of legal benefits and opportunities that are
constitutionally optional.  (Indeed, it is precisely when the interest or
benefit is itself constitutionally guaranteed, and not optional, that the
suitability of equal protection analysis is most controversial.218)
Moreover, the claim that equality is gratuitous when it simply
amounts to prohibiting the use of “irrelevant” criteria is also false.  As we
have seen, that prohibition often expresses a comparative equality right, not
simply a noncomparative right.  Once again, ignoring the distinction
confuses analysis.
Both Peters and Westen (in his earlier writings) find ways to
accommodate egalitarian norms while purporting to reject them as
gratuitous.  Both authors are curiously stipulative, defining the acceptable
form of analysis as “rights” (the early Westen) or “nonegalitarian justice”
                                           
217Peters concedes that equality can sometimes be a useful concept, but he believes that
its value is quite limited:
Sometimes calling attention to inequality of treatment reveals injustice in
treatment; recognizing a symptom can help us diagnose the disease.  But once
the disease has been identified, the important thing is to remedy the injustice,
not the resulting inequality.
Peters, supra note 1=, at 1257.
I agree that the differential in treatment is not the only concern of all equality
rights.  But Peters does not recognize that such a differential (whether in tangible
treatments or in status) is a necessary and distinctive concern of such rights.
218Thus, it is controversial whether equal protection fundamental interest analysis
represents a distinct form of analysis or should instead be understood as an aspect of
substantive due process.  See Simons, supra note 48=, at 467-472; =other cites?=.
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(Peters), and then in turn defining these as including everything except the
narrow concept of formal equality (Westen) or everything except the
narrow concept of “prescriptive” equality (Peters).  Thus, they still would
seem to accept the most important egalitarian norms, such as
antidiscrimination rights and distributive justice norms, as genuine instances
of “rights” or of “nonegalitarian justice.”  But, by submerging these norms
in the vast sea of other noncomparative norms, they was away the
distinctive qualities of  equality norms.
4. The multiplication of wrongs
Equality sometimes does demand the multiplication of wrongs.  But
that demand is sometimes appropriate.
First, the objection that equality requires the multiplication of
wrongs presupposes that the prior (or other) treatment is a “wrong.”  Thus,
it does not apply to discretionary treatments.219
Second, with respect to nondiscretionary treatments, when the
“wrong” is a gross injustice on the scale of slavery or genocide,
equalization in the direction of multiplying that wrong is indeed
unthinkable, as Alexander suggests.  The equality claim is just not that
strong relative to the imperative of avoiding the wrong.  But when the
wrong is less serious, or the equality claim more serious, multiplication is
sometimes an acceptable option.  If I am forgetful and permit one child to
stay up a few minutes past her bedtime, I might permit the other child to do
the same.220  Or I might not; but it would not be absurd for me to give
some weight to equality here.  Moreover, recall this example from above.
If an employer promotes Mark but fails to promote Wilma because of
sexism, notwithstanding that each is entitled to promotion, then the
response of promoting neither might address the equality injury.221  It is
still much better, of course, if he promotes both rather than neither; but
promoting neither at least is better in one way than promoting only one.
Peters’ approach itself unnecessarily multiplies the problem of the
multiplication of wrongs.  Recall Peters’ peculiar definition of “prescriptive
equality.” This principle is extraordinarily broad: in every case, it assumes,
if one person obtains more than she should, then all other persons with
similar entitlements should obtain more than they should.  Thus, he
virtually defines “prescriptive equality” as a requirement to multiply
wrongs.222  But such a universal principle is implausible, and indeed
                                           
219See text at notes 182-185= supra.
220For a similar example, see Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at 1265-1266.
221But note qualification, text at notes 128-132= supra.
222Peters asserts that the prescriptive force of nontautological equality is greatest when
it counsels the multiplication of wrongs, rather than the multiplication of correct
treatment; for in the latter case, the nonegalitarian treatment rule already tells us to treat
a second recipient correctly after a first recipient has been treated correctly.  Peters,
supra note 1=, at 1226.
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absurd.223  Insofar as precedential equality is a plausible principle, it surely
has a more limited domain.  Greenawalt suggests one set of limitations (to
situations in which the persons treated differently are significantly related,
and the person who receives worse treatment is aware of the better
treatment of others224); but others are also plausible.  (Consider equal
protection doctrine’s rational basis test, always requiring justification, but
often permitting a weak or even hypothetical reason to override the interest
in equal treatment.)
In this light, equality principles do not demand a strong legal
doctrine of precedent.  Equality does give some support to following
precedent, even if the precedent is today widely considered to be mistaken.
But the force of the equality demand could be weak relative to other
demands and needs, including the importance of permitting the law to
improve.225
5. Leveling down and waste
Are the leveling down and waste objections really troubling?  By
definition, these objections do not extend to impure equality rights, those
which require leveling up of benefits (or leveling down of burdens).226
But, given that decisionmakers need flexibility and face limited resources, it
will often be infeasible in our political system to recognize impure equality
rights.  Pure equality rights will remain pervasive, so the objections
endure.
Some might find the objections persuasive because they seem to
reveal that the demand for equality rests on morally unattractive
dispositions or instincts.  Envy and spite are unenviable emotions.  And one
reason why envy is an unattractive character trait is that it often expresses a
desire for leveling down, or at least a preference for leveling down over
inequality.227  But I find this view incomplete and unpersuasive.  Consider
the quality of resentment at being unjustly treated worse.  Such a feeling
might reflect a simple desire for equal treatment, however it is to be
                                           
223See text at note 121= supra.
224Greenawalt, supra note 1=, at 1266, 1272, 1289.  Greenawalt’s limitations seem too
restrictive, however.  Unrelated persons could also have a right to demand reasons for
differential treatment (as the equal protection rational basis test provides), including
mistakenly beneficial treatment received by others.  (Suppose the IRS made a small error
that benefitted 90% of a defined group of taxpayers; equality provides a reason for
extending the benefit to the other 10%.)   And the person who is treated worse might be
entitled to equal treatment even if she is unaware of her disadvantage.  (Suppose the
other 10% are unaware of the error.)
225See text at notes = supra.
226See Section  B.3= supra.
227See Nozick, supra note 90=, at 239*.  See also Rawls, supra note 51=, at 530-541
(discussing envy).  For a passionate, conservative critique of egalitarianism as resting on
envy, see Robert Bork, ch. 4 (The Passion for Equality), from Slouching Towards
Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline 66-82 (1996).
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achieved.228  A justifiably resentful person can accept leveling down,
without preferring it to leveling up.  Thus, the acceptability of leveling
down does not necessarily reflect or promote problematic dispositions.
Still, the objections to leveling down and waste have prima facie
force.  Surely it is better (all else equal) not to deprive a group of a benefit,
not to extend a burden, not to waste resources.  The question, in the end, is
the comparative force of the objections relative to egalitarian and other
norms.
Sometimes leveling down is not especially troubling.  If the benefit
in question is not of great importance, and the seriousness of the equality
violation depends significantly on the invidiousness of the trait (as in cases
of racial discrimination), then leveling down is not problematic.  (Recall the
example of the university official choosing to voice a greeting rather than
also shaking hands.)
In other contexts, such as when the benefit is very important, it is
far better if the inequality is remedied by leveling up rather than down;
indeed, other moral and legal principles might so require.
Notice, too, that when the benefit in question is divisible, the
choices are not as stark as a possibly expensive “leveling (all the way) up,”
on the one hand, or a very stingy “leveling (all the way) down,” on the
other.  If a government benefit program impermissibly discriminates against
women, the government might use the program’s resources both to level
the men part of the way down, and to level the women part of the way up.
The result is that the victims of discrimination do obtain some benefit.  Of
course, when the benefit is indivisible, a wasteful leveling down might be
the only feasible way to achieve equality.
Finally, an important political constraint will often, as a practical
matter, limit the scope and severity of both the multiplication of wrong and
the leveling down objections.  Equality rights are often invoked by
minorities.  If government responds to a violation by multiplying the wrong
(in the sense of depriving a larger group of an entitlement) or by leveling
down, this will burden, or deny a benefit to, a larger class of persons–
possibly a much larger class.  This larger class might well employ the
political process to ensure that the problem is remedied by government
eliminating rather than multiplying the wrong, or by leveling up instead of
down.229
                                           
228See Rawls, id. at 533 (distinguishing resentment, which is a moral feeling, from
envy, which is not).
229In the famous words of Justice Jackson:
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow
those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected.
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6. Privileging the status quo
The analysis of this essay helps answer some of the feminist
concerns about conventional equality approaches.  My suggestions in this
and the next subsection are necessarily sketchy, but I hope they show that
this essay’s analysis of equality can support many feminist critiques and can
illuminate debate.
One complaint is that conventional equality analysis privileges the
status quo by entitling women only to what men currently are entitled to.
But equality analysis need not be so limited.  Although equality is a
comparative concept, it is also a flexible and generous concept.  It need not
derive one class’s entitlement from what the comparison class currently
receives.230  (Thus, it need not limit women’s employment opportunities to
those that men currently have.)  Rather, equality can be, and historically
often has been, a means of social transformation, a means of critiquing
current norms.231
Consider two ways in which egalitarian norms can serve to critique
the current “male” work standard that scants family responsibilities.  First,
it is plausible to conclude that that standard itself is a product of
generations of sex discrimination.  If women had always been permitted
and encouraged to enter the work force on the same terms as men, and if
men were similarly encouraged to participate in raising children, employers
might well have developed different policies about work and family
responsibilities.  Second, different policies might well be developed today if
companies were run by women who have had significant family
responsibilities, or if legislatures included a much larger proportion of
women (or included more men highly sympathetic to women’s concerns).
To be sure, it is usually much easier to formulate a workable legal
test of “discrimination” if one limits the inquiry to whether one class’s
treatment equals another class’s current treatment.  If instead the test is
what the treatment of both classes would have been, but for past
discrimination, or but for current racist or sexist motives, stereotypes, and
selective sympathy, then the counterfactual inquiry becomes very difficult
and sometimes judicially unmanageable.232  However, the question before
us is the meaning of the concept of equality, not the pragmatic question of
                                                                                                                                 
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, = (Jackson, J., concurring).  =Note
N.J. school educational funding dispute: wealthy districts balked at leveling down.  See
Peters, supra note 1=, at =.
230See text at notes 107-109= supra (noting that a right of equal treatment does not even
depend on showing that one class is descriptively equal in any respect to another class).
231See Section D.2= supra.
232However, the Canadian Supreme Court apparently has not been deterred by these
difficulties.  It has found neutral laws discriminatory in effect, and has held that proof of
discrimination does not depend on a comparison to another class’s more favorable
current treatment.  See Kathleen E. Mahoney, The Constitutional Law of Equality in
Canada, 44 Maine L. Rev. 229, 240 (1992).  =research further.=
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which egalitarian norms should be implemented through the equal
protection clause or through legislation.  As to the first question, I am
confident that the concept of equality is broad enough to encompass most
feminist critiques of current social practices.233
Moreover, many different egalitarian norms exist.  Those interested
in improving the status and social conditions of women might be most
effective if they were to employ a variety of egalitarian approaches, not any
single approach.234  Thus, an equality norm can consider discriminatory
effects as well as discriminatory intent.  Equality norms can condemn
policies that contribute to the subordination of women, even if the policies
have a benign motivation.  Veterans’ preferences might be genuinely
motivated by patriotism and a desire to thank those who have made
extraordinary sacrifices for their nation; but the effect of these preferences
on women’s opportunities could be enough to condemn them.
These examples also help answer the complaint that conventional
equality analysis considers equality and inequality at a superficial level.  To
the contrary, egalitarian norms can address deeper forms of inequality.
Certain policies that treat men and women equally in a formal or superficial
sense (such as a denial of parental leave to any parent) might nevertheless
have a profound impact on the status of women in society, and might
therefore be properly subject to greater legal scrutiny.235  And even if it is
not feasible or wise to incorporate a deeper egalitarian norm in such legal
doctrines as the equal protection clause, the norm can be effective as a
justification of political action.
7. Privileging sameness and devaluing difference
A related complaint is that equality norms overvalue sameness and
devalue difference.  More specifically, the norm demanding “equal
treatment” might be inadequate to justify policies recognizing the
distinctiveness and social importance of sex-specific conditions such as
pregnancy.  At the same time, the alternative of demanding “special”
treatment might also be problematic.
But this complaint, like the prior one, assumes too narrow a
conception of equality.  The concerns motivating a “special treatment” or
“difference rather than sameness” approach often can be captured by
egalitarian norms.  Indeed, Congress reacted to the Court’s pregnancy
                                           
233One possible objection is that equality’s distinctive flexibility (normally permitting
either leveling up or down) is missing when the egalitarian norm takes the form of a
prohibition on acting with discriminatory intent or acting based on discriminatory
stereotypes.  I respond to that objection in section B.4= supra.
234See generally Laura W. Stein, Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the
Feminist Critiques of Privacy and Equality, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1153 (1993).
235See Deborah Rhode, The politics of paradigms: gender difference and gender
disadvantage, from Beyond Equality and Difference (G. Bock & S. James eds. 1992), ch.
8; =other cites.
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decisions with legislation amending Title VII to require that pregnancy
discrimination be treated as a form of gender discrimination.236
The “formal” equality idea is only one egalitarian norm.  A right to
equal treatment can indeed depend on being “similarly situated with respect
to the (hypothetical or actual) purposes of the law.”  But it need not be so
restricted.  It can ignore the decisionmaker’s purposes, for example, and
simply demand equality in some respect.237
As explained above, egalitarian norms need not rely on extant
descriptive equalities.  Instead, they can be premised on the desire to create
a specified form of (descriptive) equality.  For example, consider the
controversy over college funding of athletic programs for men and women.
A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that a university cannot avoid Title IX’s equal funding
requirement by proving that women are currently less interested than men
in participating in college sports.238  Part of the court’s rationale was that
Title IX’s purpose is to create a similar level of interest in women’s sports
as in men’s, and to create a similar level of status for those participating,
and thus to avoid ratifying a status quo of lesser interest that might itself be
a product of discrimination and gender stereotypes.239
Still, equality analysis cannot express all versions of the complaint
that conventional equality norms do not adequately value difference and
diversity.  Insofar as the celebration of difference and diversity expresses a
genuine pluralism, equality norms are largely inapposite.240  For example,
suppose separate women’s educational institutions are defended, not on the
ground that they recognize women’s distinctive learning styles and thus
ultimately promote equal job opportunities, but on the ground that they
cultivate distinctive values (such as supportive rather than competitive
relationships, or group rather than individual learning).  “To the extent
difference theory demonstrates the existence of radical, irreducible
difference among groups, it undercuts the justification for working toward
equality for those groups.”241
                                           
236Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.  §2000e(k)(1982).
237An example is Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).  In
Harper, the Court invalidated a poll tax and essentially ignored state interests in
obtaining revenues or in limiting the vote to those with a stronger interest in voting.
Instead, the Court simply concluded that if the state chooses to make an office elective
rather than appointive, it may not draw de facto wealth distinctions among voters, even
if those distinctions would indeed serve these state interests.  See Simons, supra note
48=, at 476-477.
238Cohen v. Brown University, 101 F.3d 155, 175-181(1st Cir. 1996).
239Id. at 180-181.
240Even here, however, equality can play a part, if pluralism expresses the notion that
different values or ideals are equally valuable.  But insofar as pluralism expresses the
idea that the different values deserving of respect are incommensurable, equality is
inapposite.
241Ward, supra note 43=, at 98.
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F. Conclusion
I began with two questions.  First, is equality really a meaningful,
coherent, distinctive norm in law and morality?  My positive answer, and
the reasons for it, should by now be clear.  Second, what explains the
persistent doubts that many feel about this answer?  I have addressed this
question, too, both explicitly and implicitly.  Let me review some reasons.
First, it is easy to confuse the lexical equality that follows as a
consequence of applying a normative principle (e.g., two persons “should
be treated equally” in the trivial sense that a general rule entitles each of
them to identical treatment), with a comparative equality right that operates
as a ground for a normative principle (e.g., equal protection doctrine, or
Rawls’ difference principle).  Only in the latter case does the “right to equal
treatment” express a genuine egalitarian norm.
Second, it is also easy to assume that prohibitions on “irrelevant”
criteria have nothing to do with equality.  While this is true of some such
prohibitions, it is not true of all.  Equality sometimes does demand that a
relevant reason explain distinctions in treatment (though equality often
demands something more or something different).
Third, equality operates in a number of different contexts, with a
force that depends very much on the context.  For example, sometimes
equality has more force when the decision is discretionary rather than
nondiscretionary, insofar as discretionary decisions do not trigger the
objection that equality multiplies a wrong.  Sometimes equality operates as
a metaprinciple, dictating how the entitlements under a rule should be
distributed when the rule cannot be fully implemented.  And sometimes
equality operates as a (possibly weak) demand for reasoned explanation of
any differential in treatment.
Fourth, it is a commonplace that equality as to one thing normally
means inequality as to another.  Requiring equal per capita distribution of
resources means that those who make greater efforts receive no greater
reward, resulting in unequal distribution of resources relative to effort.  It is
then tempting to conclude that all that really matters is the “thing” that
must be equalized.  But this conclusion does not follow.  Of course it does
matter very much what an equality right requires to be equalized.242  But it
is also critical whether equalization itself matters.  If it does not, if what
matters instead is distributing the good or resource to any deserving
persons, then the right in question does not concern equality at all.
                                           
242See generally Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (=).  As Raz argues: “We only
have reason to care about inequalities in the distributions of goods and ills, that is of
what is of value or disvalue for independent reasons.  There is no reason to care about
inequalities in the distribution of grains of sand, unless there is some other reason to
wish to have or to avoid sand.”  Raz, supra note 22=, at 235 (emphasis original).  This is
overstated–e.g., for some nondiscrimination rights, such as the right not to suffer racial
discrimination, the subject-matter hardly matters–but it is indeed true of many equality
rights, especially positive rights to the equal distribution of an opportunity or resource.
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The right to equal treatment is a curious principle.  It is a peculiarly
weak principle, insofar as it its requirements are contingent and flexible,
and therefore do not, by themselves, dictate any specific treatment at all.
Indeed, these features have caused some observers to doubt that it has any
meaning.  But equality is also an unusually potent principle, for it is a
principle of enormously wide application, a principle that constrains even
discretionary decisions, and a principle that sometimes requires leveling
down of benefits or even the multiplication of wrongs.
The contingency and flexibility of equality rights prompt a final
question.  Is the need for equality rights a concession to human fallibility?
If we were not prone to bias and prejudice and undue impartiality, or to
envy and jealousy, would purely noncomparative rules and principles
suffice?  I think not.  Some equality rights, especially nondiscrimination
rights, do indeed respond to human imperfection.  Others, however,
especially equality rights embodied within distributive justice theories, are
part of a positive social vision, a vision that is not premised on a perceived
need to transcend human frailty.  For example, in one such vision,
government should alleviate inevitable inequalities in natural talents in
order to assure more equal social opportunities.  At the same time, in this
vision we might see certain forms of partiality (for example, towards one’s
family or community) as socially desirable, not regrettable.243
We can safely cast the skeptical doubts aside.  Equality indeed has a
logic of its own.  In both law and morality, the right to equal treatment is
significant and distinctive.  And its sometimes complexity should not mask
its conceptual value and transformative power.
                                           
243See generally Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (1991).
